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Abstract: Private sector workers in the United States have witnessed a major shift in 
retirement planning.  In the 1950s through the 1980s, defined benefit (DB) retirement 
plans were ubiquitous. In the 21st century, however, firms have eschewed DB plans, and 
now most private sector workers are covered by a defined contribution (DC) retirement 
plan. The shift to DC plans transferred identifiable market risk from the employer to the 
employee. In exchange for bearing more market risk, DC plans gave employees more 
control over their retirement accounts as they were now able to make the majority of 
investment decisions. Even as DC plans become more popular, many worried that this 
shift might make workers and their retirement more susceptible to large market shocks 
such as the 2008 financial crisis.  In this thesis, I use the 2008 financial crisis as a natural 
experiment to test how well DC plans survive recessionary periods. 
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Defined Contribution Plans and the 2008 Financial Crisis 
 
 
 
I.   Introduction 
 
 This thesis provides an analysis of a question of growing significance and 
controversy: How much of an impact do recessionary periods have on the retirement 
savings behaviors of workers with a defined contribution (DC) plan? DC plans (often 
referred to as 401(k) plans) are employee retirement savings plans that feature tax-
deductible contributions made by both the employee and the employer, tax-free accrual 
of earnings, and annual contribution limits (Engen & Gale, 2000).  Under a DC plan, both 
the employee and (possibly) the employer make contributions to an investment account. 
Total retirement benefits, thus, can be measured as the total value contributed from both 
parties plus any accrued return at the time of retirement. Typically, an employee 
contributes a portion of his or her earnings to an account that they control with some 
constraints. The employer can also make contributions to this account, which are 
frequently made as a “match” or “partial match” of employee contributions. There is 
however, a limit to how much an individual can contribute to their account per year. For 
the past three years, the maximum amount an employee could contribute to their DC 
account was $18,000 per year. Total annual employer contributions are also limited. 
Recently, this limit has been set at $54,000. A “catch-up” provision for employees over 
the age of 50, however, allows employees to contribute up to $24,000 annually. 
Withdrawals from a DC account are taxed as ordinary income, and depending on 
the age of the employee can be subject to certain penalties. Specifically, if employees 
withdraw from their 401(k) account prior to the age of 59½, withdrawals may be subject 
to a 10 percent federal tax penalty. Penalties on withdrawals may be lifted if the 
employee has a permanent disability, or medical expenses, that are greater than 7.5 
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percent of their adjusted gross income (Engen & Gale, 2000). Because employees control 
to some extent how much is contributed to their DC account and are also given the 
opportunity to make early withdraws, pension balances are subject to extreme volatility. 
The increasing importance of DC plans occurred during the early 1980s when 
regulations led to rapid growth of 401(k) plans (Ippolito, 1995). Prior to the 1980s, 
defined benefit plans (DB) were ubiquitous. Unlike a DC plan, DB retirement plans place 
the burden of funding the plan entirely on the employer. It is defined benefit because the 
plan guarantees a specific amount of money (a certain amount of benefit) to the 
employee throughout retirement. In most cases, the retirement benefit from a DB plan 
depends on the employee’s length of employment with the firm and the employee’s 
salary at retirement or average salary over the previous several years. Because the benefit 
is guaranteed, the financial risk is put on the employer rather than on the employee. 
Despite the employer bearing the financial risk to DB plans, there are other risks and 
costs bared by employees with a DB plan. For one, should the firm go bankrupt before 
the benefits are paid out, employees with a DB plan may be left with a worthless 
retirement portfolio.1 Second, DB plans restrict labor mobility of employees. Employees 
must stay with the same employer long enough to become vested with the plan. 
Switching employers, which could provide for a higher salary to the employee, could also 
drastically reduce or eliminate employee benefits.  
Even though the transition to DC plans allowed for more labor mobility, one 
important argument against DC plans was the shift in financial risk from the employer to 
the employee. Unlike a DB plan, employees with a DC plan have more control over 
investment decisions and therefore accumulate more responsibility for pension balances. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  For example, the Enron bankruptcy was particularly brutal because all retirement funds were invested in 
Enron stock, and in the end workers’ retirement funds disappeared.	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It particularly left those who lack investment experience vulnerable to lower pension 
balances. Pension benefits were no longer guaranteed to those under a DC plan.  
Although the method of accumulating DC retirement wealth is risky, it is not 
necessarily riskier than a DB plan. Several studies directly compare the risks of DB and 
DC plans; however, four studies are particularly notable. Balcer and Sahin (1979) seek to 
identify the ultimate benefits derived from DB pension plans under various vesting 
periods, termination rates, periods of employment, and economic assumptions, and they 
identify these benefits from three different perspectives, the employee’s, the employer’s, 
and the government’s. Bodie, Marcus, and Merton (1988) compare the trade-offs of 
switching from a DB to a DC pension plan system. They find that DB plans offer the 
employee more stable retirement replacement rates of final income, however, DC plans 
are more favorable during periods of inflation because employees can more easily 
calculate the current value of their DC plan and they are also able to invest in inflation-
protected portfolios rather than the normal DB annuities. Samwick and Skinner (2004) 
used the SCF to summarize the attributes of DB and DC pension plans. They found that 
DC accumulations are very likely to exceed those in a DB pension plan. Lastly, Schrager 
(2006) studied the benefits of DB and DC pension plans in relation to labor market 
mobility. She found that job turnover increased heavily in the 1990s, which led DC 
pension plans to be highly favorable to many employees. The results of these four studies 
conclude that even though DC pension plans are risky in terms of how total benefits are 
accumulated, they provide many benefits to the employee that DB plans cannot.  
Because employees make decisions regarding market exposure to risk, the 
fundamental relationship between the 2008 financial crisis and the value of defined 
contribution plans became subject to further review. In the 2008 financial crisis, nearly a 
third of public wealth vanished, and U.S. private pension fund assets declined roughly by 
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one-fourth, or 2.7 trillion dollars (Whitehouse, 2009). With the rise in DC plans in the 
1990s, individuals without financial acumen became more directly linked to stock market 
returns, and if there is an unwillingness to actively manage the funds, that risk is more 
acute the closer the employee is to retirement. Employees with DC plans are undoubtedly 
more vulnerable to significant decreases in pension funds due to market volatility. As 
such, there is an opportunity to use the 2008 financial crisis as a natural experiment to 
test the robustness of DC plans.  
Using the 2008 financial crisis as a natural experiment, my empirical model is 
designed to analyze how employees with DC plans react during and after large negative 
financial shocks. Specifically, my analysis considers how the value of pension accounts, 
the percent and the amount of earnings contributed to the account, the employee’s 
willingness to participate in DC plans, and employee’s market risk exposure to any extent 
were affected by the financial crisis of 2008. This analysis ultimately answers the 
question of how sensitive DC plans are to financial volatility. Specifically, using data 
from the 2004, 2007, 2010, and 2013 waves of the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), 
the results show that pension balances decreased by roughly 20 percent immediately 
following the financial crisis, but this is only observed for the youngest and oldest age 
cohorts. Only employees in the oldest age group (55 to 64 year-olds) reduced both the 
percent of income contributed and the dollar amount of income contributed. However, 
participation rates remained stable regardless of age throughout and following the 
financial crisis. Overall, the SCF data suggests that the financial crisis did not have a 
large impact on DC plans except in regard to risk exposure. In the years following the 
financial crisis, younger employees started opting to invest in riskier assets, rather than 
veering away from them, possibly because of their cheaper price. In contrast, older 
employees, who were close to retirement, started to invest more in “safer” assets such as 
	   5 
bonds. Moreover, when segregating each age group into upper, middle, and lower class, 
the same general pattern emerges. However, in this analysis, the 2008 financial crisis had 
more of an impact on retirement saving behaviors for the upper and middle classes, 
specifically within older age cohorts. Pension balances were reduced by 27 percent for 
the middle class of 55 to 64 year-olds in 2010, and the percent of income contributed 
decreased by at least 1.27 percent for the middle class regardless of age. Although the 
amount of income contributed increased drastically for young (25 to 34 year-olds) 
employees in the top tier of the income distribution, it decreased for middle-aged 
employees who were in the middle of the income distribution. Finally, regardless of age 
and income class, participation rates remained stable.  
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Section II introduces the data used 
in this analysis. Section III describes the two main models that are used to study the 
changes in employee retirement savings behaviors during and following the 2008 
financial crisis. Model (1) focuses on the deviations in savings behaviors within specified 
age cohorts, while Model (2) further identifies the variation in retirement savings 
behaviors for each age group within specific income classes. Section IV discusses the 
results of Model (1), an age cohort analysis, and Section V explains the results from 
Model (2), an age cohort by income class analysis. Section VI provides a discussion and 
explanation of the preceding results, and is followed by multiple checks of robustness in 
Section VII. The thesis is then concluded in Section VIII.   
 
II.   Data Description 
 
Multiple waves of the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) are used to study how 
pension balances, participation rates, the percent and the amount of income contributed, 
and voluntary exposure to market risk of defined contribution plans compare before and 
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after the 2008 financial crisis. The SCF is maintained by the Federal Reserve Board and 
conducted every three years. It is designed to collect detailed information on the finances 
of households across the United States, which includes family income, net worth, and 
other balance sheet components, as well as to reveal broad-based gains and losses of 
household financial and retirement wealth. One important feature of the SCF is that it 
intentionally oversamples wealthy households. This oversampling makes the SCF ideal 
for studying retirement wealth. Additionally, the SCF is appropriate for this research 
because it contains information on DC plan characteristics including the current value of 
an individual’s pension account, the percent and the amount of income contributed, and a 
rough description of each household’s retirement portfolios.  
Because of its thoroughness in retirement plan details, the SCF has been used 
repeatedly to study retirement savings behaviors. Samwick and Skinner (2004) used the 
SCF to summarize DC plan attributes and evaluate DB and DC wealth accumulation. 
Ultimately, they found that employees’ DC plan accumulations are likely to exceed those 
in a defined benefit plan. Alicia Munnell (2012) studied the effects of current legislation 
(Pension Protection Act of 2006) and the 2008 financial crisis on the value of 401(k) 
plans using the 2010 SCF. She found that the median 401(k) balance in 2010 for 
households nearing retirement was $120,000 (roughly the same as 2007 median balance), 
and declined for younger households compared to 2007. William Even and David 
MacPherson (2007) analyzed the consequences of the transformation from DB to DC 
plans on the distribution of future pension wealth using the 2001 SCF. The analysis 
concluded that the shift from DB to DC plans simultaneously increased the level and 
inequality of pension wealth. The analysis also found that DC plans significantly 
decreased the pension wealth of low income workers at the time of retirement.  
Because the 2008 financial crisis will be used as a natural experiment to test how 
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well DC plans perform in response to financial shocks, the analysis uses the 2004, 2007, 
2010, and 2013 waves of the SCF. More specifically, the 2004 and 2007 waves will be 
considered pre-financial crisis data, while the 2010 and 2013 waves will be treated 
(separately) as post-financial crisis information.  
The SCF, however, does have a couple issues that need to be addressed. First, as 
previously mentioned, the SCF over-samples wealthy households. This is resolved by 
using the household weight variable provided by the SCF. Second, because of the 
sensitive nature of the questions asked by the SCF, some individuals are either unwilling 
or unable to report certain financial variables. In this case, the SCF imputes those missing 
responses using a predictive algorithm. Moreover, the algorithm allows for randomness. 
To address this, the SCF calculates five imputations for each missing value. Each 
observation in the SCF, therefore, is associated with five replications. In order to avoid 
multiple observations of the same individual, which would artificially deflate standard 
errors, only one replication is kept for each household. Third, the SCF is not a panel 
dataset. Thus, the effects of the financial crisis on an employee’s retirement savings 
behaviors cannot be studied at an individual level overtime. Instead, a cohort analysis of 
age groups is used to identify average effects by cohort overtime.  
Deviations in employee retirement savings behaviors will be analyzed in five 
different ways: (1) total DC pension balances, (2) the amount of income contributed, (3) 
the percent of income contributed in dollars, (4) participation rates, and (5) the 
employee’s chosen level of exposure to market risk. These behaviors are studied at the 
household level as households, not individuals in a multi-person household, arguably 
make retirement decisions. For example, if either the respondent or their spouse reports 
having a defined contribution plan, the household is classified as having a DC plan. In 
order to record pension balances, respondents were asked “What is the balance of 
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(your/his/her/his or her) pension account now”. Total household pension balance is equal 
to the sum of both spouses’ answers, assuming both accounts were DC plans.  
The SCF also asked respondents “(Do you/Does she/Does he or she) make 
contributions to this plan through salary deduction, union dues, and direct contribution.” 
Those households for which either (or both) adults answered “Yes” were labeled as 
“participating” in their DC plan. For the participants, this question was then followed up 
with “What percent of your pay or what amount (do you/does he/ does she/ does he or 
she) contribute currently per pay period or per year” excluding payments on any form of 
loans. The amount of income contributed, in dollar value, was calculated simply by 
summing the dollar value of the husband and wife’s contributions to their DC plan. Total 
household percent of salary contributed was then calculated based off employee’s amount 
of income contributed to their pension account. For clarification, if either the husband or 
wife answered yes to making contributions, the household was labeled as participating in 
a DC plan. Because the percent and the amount of income contributed are calculated only 
for participating households, the sample size is reduced when looking at contribution 
amounts (or percentages) compared to when looking at participation rates or even 
pension balances.2 
In order to study exposure to market risk, individual household investment 
choices need to be examined. In the SCF, respondents were asked “How is (your plan) 
invested? It is all in stocks, all in interest-earning assets, is it split between these or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  For clarification purposes, imagine a household where a husband has a DB plan, and a wife who has a DC 
plan, is currently making contributions to the account. The wife makes contributions to the pension account 
up until the household decides to have children who eventually go off to college. At this point, the 
household decides to discontinue making contributions. In this situation, the household has a pension 
balance, and will be included in the pension balance regression. They are included in the participation 
regression (as it is based off whether or not the household is contributing) and are classified as non-
participants, but they are not included in the amount of income contributed or the percent of income 
contributed due to the restriction of only current DC plan contributors.  
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something else?” Given their responses, participants were classified into three groups: 
those who invest in all stocks, those who invest all in bonds, and those who invest in both 
stocks and bonds.3 Households were only classified as investing in all stocks or in all 
bonds if both spouses responded with “all stock” or “all bond”. If one partner responded 
with all stock, and the other responded with all bonds, or both stocks and bonds, the 
household was classified as investing in both stocks and bonds. These investment choices 
were then ordered in terms of financial risk. Stocks were classified as the riskiest, bonds 
were classified as the least risky, and owning both stocks and bonds was classified as an 
intermediate amount of market risk.  
Because the SCF is not a panel dataset, a cohort analysis is necessary. 
Specifically, identify the pre- and post- financial crisis effects by identifying age groups: 
25–34 year-olds, 35–44 year-olds, 45–54 year-olds, and 55–64 year-olds.  By interacting 
the pre- and post- time periods with the four age groups, I am able to identify how the 
various dependent variables differ by age pre-financial crisis versus post-financial crisis. I 
will also look at these effects on a generational level as well. That is, similar to age 
groups, each person in the SCF can be associated with a generation defined by birth year: 
Traditionalists (born 1910 – 1945), Baby Boomers (born 1946 – 1964), Generation X 
(born 1965 – 1980), and Millennials (born 1981 or after).  A similar difference-in-
differences estimation approach is then used to identify generational cohort effects pre- 
versus post-financial crisis.  
In addition to identifying pre- versus post- financial crisis effects by age, the 
analysis will also further interact their effect by income class in order to see if the effect 
depends on income level. Specifically, three income classes (upper, middle, and lower) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  If a household chose to invest in some other type of financial asset other than stocks and bonds, they were 
dropped from the analysis.	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based on the Economic Policy Institute’s definition of the income classes. More 
explicitly, the upper class was defined as households having an annual income of 
$390,000 or higher. The lower class were households having an income less than $30,000 
per year. The middle class households were all that fell in between the upper and lower 
class thresholds.  
Although focus is planned on the pre-versus post- age cohort effect, the 
econometric models must also include an array of individual/household characteristics 
that are likely to affect retirement savings behaviors. Included here are marital status, 
educational achievement, race, and number of children under the age of 18. Each 
household was sorted into one of three marital statuses: a single male, a single female, or 
a married couple. Education was classified into five groups with the head of the 
household having less than a high school degree, a high school degree, some college 
experience, a college degree and an advanced degree. Race was classified by the head of 
the household being either Caucasian, African American or Hispanic.4 
In addition to demographic characteristics, a household’s financial characteristics 
are certain to also affect retirement savings decisions. The household’s financial 
characteristics assumed to influence these decisions are home equity value (value less 
outstanding debt), income, number of years involved with the current DC plan, whether 
the household owns a part of or complete ownership share in a business, whether the 
household has ever filed for bankruptcy, and the household’s self-reported level of risk 
aversion.5 The risk adverse variable was created from the household’s answer to the 
question “Which of the statements on this page comes closest to the amount of financial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Those who responded with “other” for their race were dropped from the analysis.  
5	  All currency variables (included both independent and dependent variables) are adjusted for inflation, and 
measured in 2013 dollar value.  
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risk that you are willing to take when you save or make investments?” The options were 
then given in increasing order of not willing to take on any financial risk to willing to 
take substantial risks. Depending on the level of the respondent’s answer, households and 
their risk aversion level were then categorized into three main groups: people who take 
large financial risks, average risk, and no amount of risk.   
Lastly, the data are restricted to only those head of households aged 25 to 64 
years-old who are currently working and eligible to make contributions to a DC 
retirement plan. Anyone in retirement or likely still in college (under the age of 25) thus, 
is omitted. Because this analysis focuses on examining how households change their 
retirement savings behaviors during time of economic downfall, specifically analyzing 
how participation rates and current income contributions fluctuate, those in retirement 
would be inappropriate for this study. Households in retirement are in the process of 
spending their pension benefits, not accumulating them. Likewise, those who are still in 
college have yet to enter the workplace and currently do not have retirement plans. 
 
III.   Identification & Modeling  
As described in Table 1, age, demographic, and financial variables will be used to 
explain how retirement savings behaviors differed pre- versus post- financial crisis. Using 
total pension balances as an example, the main empirical model (Model 1) for each 
dependent variable will adhere to the following format:  
 
Model (1) 
Balances =  b0 + β1XDemog + β2XFin 
+ α40Age40  + α50Age50  + α60Age60 
+ α31Age30×Yr10 + α41Age40×Yr10 + α51Age50×Yr10 +α61Age60×Yr10 
+ α32Age30×Yr13 + α42Age40×Yr13 + α52Age50×Yr13 + α62Age60×Yr13     + ε  
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where XDemog is a vector of demographic variables, including marital status, educational 
achievement, race, and number of children under the age of 18 in the household, and XFin 
is a vector of financial variables consisting of home equity, income, number of years 
involved with the current DC plan, whether the household owns a business, whether the 
household has ever filed for bankruptcy, and the household’s reported level of financial 
risk aversion. Although XDemog and XFin are likely determinants of most financial 
decisions, including retirement behaviors, the focus of this thesis concerns how 
retirement savings for specific age groups were affected by the financial crisis, which are 
identified with the rest of the model. In particular, α40, α50, and α60, allow for differences in 
average total pension balances for 35 to 44 year-olds (α40), 45 to 54 year-olds (α50), and 
55 to 64 year-olds (α60) compared to 25 to 34 year olds (the omitted group) for the “pre” 
time period of 2004 and 2007.  
To this end, the last two rows of Model (1) then include predictors of the change 
in pension balances (or the other dependent variables) by age groups from 2004/2007 to 
2010 and from 2004/2007 to 2013. In each case, the first subscript number on an α 
coefficient refers to the age group (3 = 25 to 34 year-olds; 4 = 35 to 44 year-olds; 5 = 45 
to 54 year-olds; 6 = 55 to 64 year-olds), while the second subscription number refers to 
the change in time period (1 = 2004/2007 to 2010; 2 = 2004/2007 to 2013). Therefore, for 
example, α41, is the average change in plan balances for 35 to 44 year-olds from 
2004/2007 to 2010 while α52 is the average change in pension balances for 45 to 54 year-
olds from 2004/2007 to 2013.  
 Model (1) allows for a direct comparison between pension balances in 2010 and 
2013 by age. Specifically, this comparison seeks to understand whether there were 
differences in pension balances by age from the years 2010 and 2013 following the 
financial crisis. For example, the average change pension balances for 55 to 64 year-olds 
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in 2013 from 2004/2007 (α62) is subtracted from the average change in pension for 55 to 
64 year-olds in 2010 from 2004/2007 (α61) in order to analyze the difference in average 
pension balances from 2013 to 2010. This process is repeated for each of the four age 
cohorts. In this scenario, the 2010 effects on pension balances can be viewed as the short-
term effects, while the 2013 effects can be thought of as the long-term effects of the 2008 
financial crisis. Testing the differences in these short and long term effects might allow 
us to see how long the potential effects linger after a financial crisis for specific age 
classes.   
In addition to estimating how behavior changed pre- versus post- financial crisis 
(Model 1) we can also separately identify these effects by income class. Analyzing how 
the financial crisis affected specific income classes by age calls for a slightly different 
empirical model. Specifically, each age cohort is further separated into three groups, 
upper, middle, and lower class. This creates three pre-age variables, and six post-age 
variables. Using 35 through 40 year olds as an example, the original Age40 dummy 
variable is interacted with upper, middle, and lower class and with both post year dummy 
variables, Yr10 and Yr13. This ultimately leads to the creation of nine “new” groups for 
each age cohort, and therefore thirty-six new estimated coefficients overall. Similar to 
Model (1), each separated column of three displays the variables that are directly 
compared to one another. Again, using pension balances as the example, Model (2) 
explains each of the five dependent variables according to: 
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Model (2) 
 
Balances = b0 + β1XDemog + β2XFin 
    + λ30MAge30×Mid  + λ30UAge30×Up  
+ λ31LAge30×Low×Yr10 + λ31MAge30×Mid×Yr10 + λ31UAge30×Up×Yr10  
+ λ32LAge30×Low×Yr13 + λ32MAge30×Mid×Yr13 + λ32UAge30×Up×Yr13  
 
+ λ40LAge40×Low  + λ40MAge40×Mid  + λ40UAge40×Up  
+ λ41LAge40×Low×Yr10 + λ41MAge40×Mid×Yr10 + λ41UAge40×Up×Yr10  
+ λ42LAge40×Low×Yr13 + λ42MAge40×Mid×Yr13 + λ42UAge40×Up×Yr13  
 
+ λ50LAge50×Low  + λ50MAge50×Mid  + λ50UAge50×Up  
+ λ51LAge50×Low×Yr10 + λ51MAge50×Mid×Yr10 + λ51UAge50×Up×Yr10  
+ λ52LAge50×Low×Yr13 + λ52MAge50×Mid×Yr13 + λ52UAge50×Up×Yr13  
 
+ λ60LAge60×Low  + λ60MAge60×Mid  + λ60UAge60×Up  
+ λ61LAge60×Low×Yr10 + λ61MAge60×Mid×Yr10 + λ61UAge60×Up×Yr10  
+ λ62LAge60×Low×Yr13 + λ62MAge60×Mid×Yr13 + λ62UAge60×Up×Yr13        + ε 
 
In contrast to Model (1), Model (2) estimates age effects by income class. To this 
end, the labeling of the l coefficients is identical in terms of the subscript number, but 
each l coefficient is also subscripted by the household’s income class: L= Lower-class; 
M= Middle-Class; U = Upper-Class. Therefore, similar to before,  l30(M/U),  l40(L/M/U), 
l50(L/M/U), and l60(L/M/U) , allow for differences in average total pension balances for 25 to 
34 year-olds (l30), 35 to 44 year-olds (l40), 45 to 54 year-olds (l50), and 55 to 64 year-
olds (l60) in the upper, middle, and lower class respectively, compared to the lower class 
25 to 34 year-olds (the omitted group) in the “pre” time period of 2004 and 2007.  
The last two rows of each separated age group in Model (2) then include the 
change in pension balances (or the other dependent variables) by age groups from 
2004/2007 to 2010 and from 2004/2007 to 2013 for each of the various income classes.  
In each case, similar to before, the first subscription number on a l coefficient refers to 
the age group (3 = 25 to 34 year-olds; 4 = 35 to 44 year-olds; 5 = 45 to 54 year-olds; 6 = 
55 to 64 year-olds), while the second subscript number refers to the change in time period 
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(1 = 2004/2007 to 2010; 2 = 2004/2007 to 2013). Therefore, for example, l41L, is the 
average change in plan balances for lower class 35 to 44 year-olds from 2004/2007 to 
2010 while l52M is the average change in pension balances for middle class 45 to 54 year-
olds from 2004/2007 to 2013.  
Similar to Model (1), Model (2) also allows a direct comparison between 2010 
and 2013 pension account balances. For example, l42M - l41M provides an estimate of the 
change in the dependent variable from 2010 to 2013 for 35 to 44 year-olds in the middle 
class. This difference, e.g. (l42M - l41M), is used to see if the post-crisis effects are 
exacerbated as more time passes following the crisis. Specifically, the 2010 effects on 
pension balances can be thought of as the short-term effects, while the 2013 effects can 
be viewed as the long-term effects of the 2008 financial crisis. Testing the difference in 
these long and short term effects might allow us to see how long the potential effects 
linger after a financial crisis for specific age and income classes.   
Ordinary least squares (OLS) is appropriate to consider for the three dependent 
variables that are measured continuously. These include logged pension balances, the 
percent of income contributed (measured from 0 to 100), and the amount of money 
contributed to the account annually (measured in dollars). The assumptions of the 
classical linear multiple regression model are: 
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(1)  The Y variable is derived from the following process:  
Yi = b0 + b1X1,i + b2X2,i +…+ bkXk,i + εi 
(2)  E(εi) = 0 for all i = 1,2, …. , n 
(3)  Cov(Xj,i, εi) = 0 for all i = 1,2, … , n and for all j = 1, 2,… , k  (exogencity) 
(4)  Cov(εi, εj) = 0 for all i,j = 1,2, … , n where i ≠j (no serial correlation) 
(5)  Var(εi) = 𝜎ε2 > 0 for all i = 1,2 , … , n (homoskedastic errors) 
(6)  None of the X’s are linear combinations 
 
In order to examine whether the assumptions are met, multiple tests were 
performed. Taking the assumptions in order, it must first be examined whether the 
dependent variables are linear in nature. To make this assessment, scatterplots were 
created for each of the three dependent variables against age. For pension balances, the 
scatterplot (Figure 1) shows that the relationship is clearly not linear. This is probably not 
unexpected as pension balances are, by definition, bounded from below at $0. One 
possible adjustment is to use a non-linear transformation of the data. Figure 2 plots the 
natural log of pension balances against age. Under this transformation, the data looks 
much more linear, with both positive and negative shocks clearly present at all ages.  
Scatterplots were also created for the amount of income contributed and the 
percent of income contributed to check for linear relationships. When looking at the 
amount of income contributed (Figure 3), the relationship is again not linear. However, a 
non-linear transformation was not applied to the amount of income contributed for 
several reasons. First, unlike pension balances which are $100,000 on average, 
contributions are much smaller at $1,870 on average. The benefit of a log transformation, 
therefore, is much less clear. This is especially true from an economic point of view if 
individuals tend to think about retirement contributions in dollars rather than in 
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percentages, which is likely the case as employees choose their yearly contributions in 
dollar amounts. Moreover, the annual employee contribution limit for DC pension plans 
is set in dollars at $18,000 or $24,000 depending on age. Second, using dollar values is 
consistent with the literature. Poterba (2014) uses dollar values to determine the impact of 
defined contribution plans on retirement placement rates and to estimate the wealth of 
households in retirement. VanDerhei (2009) summarizes the impact of the financial crisis 
on the value of defined contribution plans using dollar values, and Tang, Mitchell and 
Utkus (2012) use dollar values to estimate the difference in pre- and post-financial crisis 
average account balances of 401(k) participants. Third, to provide a robustness check of 
the linearity assumption, the regression of annual contributions was re-estimated using 
only those households with under $100,000 of contributions, which, as shown by Figure 
3, omits most of the outliers. Although not reported here, adding this restriction did not 
change the results in any meaningful way.  
As shown in Figure 4, the percent of income contributed is also not linear with 
age, again because of positive outliers. The problem, though, is not the linearity 
assumption but rather because the percent of income contributed is bounded by 0 and 
100.6 Therefore, the actual errors (not the predicted residuals) are bounded as well, and 
consequently there cannot be overly large positive or negative shocks. This bounding not 
only violates assumption number (1), but it also violates the assumption that the errors 
are distributed with consistent positive variances (heteroskedasticity). In order to correct 
for this problem, a censored normal regression was performed for each regression in 
which the percent of income contributed serves as the dependent variable. For this 
application, the censored normal regression model assumes the upper and lower bounds 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  Only 76 people contributed 0 percent of their income and only 1 person contributed 100 percent of their 
income.	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are 0 and 100, respectively, and corrects the estimated coefficients under this error 
structure (Tobin, 1958). For all models, the censored normal regression results remained 
consistent with those in the regular OLS regressions.  
Assumption (2) cannot be directly checked because OLS guarantees the sum of 
the residuals be 0 whenever the model includes a constant term, which all of my models 
do. 
As for assumption (3), OLS estimation forces the estimated residuals to be 
uncorrelated with the independent variables, so the residuals and independent variables 
cannot be used to test this assumption. Moreover, when assumption (3) is violated it is 
most likely due to an omitted explanatory variable. Therefore, this assumption will be 
checked using the Ramsey Regression Specification Error test for all dependent variables 
(Ramsey, 1969). The test for all models concluded that there was omitted variable bias. 
Despite the failure, however, each model had a relatively high R2, and the models already 
contain a large number of explanatory variables, including several demographic and 
household financial variables. Despite the apparent omission of at least one independent 
variables, the issue cannot be further addressed.  
Assumption (4), no serial correlation, is most often violated when using time 
series data as a shock in one period that may be felt for many periods in the future. 
Because the SCF is cross-sectional data and not a panel data set, violation of assumption 
(4) is not a concern. It can, therefore, be assumed that the errors are serially uncorrelated.  
Assumption (5) will be tested for each dependent variable using a standard White 
test (White, 1980). For all my models, heteroskedasticity appears to be a problem, 
however, the source of the heteroskedasticity is unclear. It is likely that it is probably due 
to the large variance in household wealth, but again, the source is unknown. To provide a 
robustness check for assumption (5), models (1) and (2) were re-estimated using only 
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those households with total net worth under $2,000,000. Although this restriction limited 
the sample size for each regression, the magnitude and signs of the parameters were 
generally left unchanged.  
Multicollinearity will be checked using both the sample correlation coefficients 
and the variance inflation factor (VIF) test. If either the correlation or the VIF are too 
high, multicollinearity may be a concern. In all models, most correlation coefficients 
ranged between 0.05 and .12. Likewise, the variance inflation factors were generally 
under 3 for all models, and none were high enough to be of concern.7 Together, therefore, 
the results of the two tests suggest that none of the explanatory variables are so highly 
correlated with each other to be a concern.  
The econometric procedures (and assumptions) for predicting participation (a 
dummy variable) and risk exposure (an ordinal, discrete variable) are different from the 
OLS model used for the previous three dependent variables. Specifically, the decision to 
participate in a DC plan (by making contributions) is a binary variable and will be 
estimated using a standard logit procedure. Logistic regression assumes the probability of 
observing Y = 1 is:  
 
Pr(Yi = 1) = F(b0 + b1X1,i + b2X2,i +…+ bkXk,i) = 
""#$%(b'	  )	  b*+*	  )	  b,+,	  )⋯)	  b.+.)/0	  ) 
 
where F is the cumulative distribution of a Bernoulli Type II. Maximum likelihood 
techniques can then be used to estimate the b’s. Unfortunately, as this is a non-linear 
model, the estimated b’s cannot be interpreted as the marginal effects. This is clear as the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  The highest VIFs were on the classification variables that interacted age with income. This was expected, 
however, as it is well documented that income and net worth tend to increase with age.	  	  
	   20 
derivative of the above probability expression with respect to any of the X variables does 
not equal the corresponding b. That is:  
 
 234(50	  6")278  = bj · $%(b'	  )	  b*+*	  )	  b,+,	  )⋯)	  b.+.	  )"#	  $%(b'	  )	  b*+*	  )	  b,+,	  )⋯)	  b.+.	  )  ≠ bj 
 
However, in these models, the sign of the estimated coefficients and the statistical 
significance are important. 
 
 The employee’s chosen level of exposure to market risk requires an even more 
sophisticated estimation technique. Because of the ordinal nature of the market risk 
variable, an ordered logit is used to identify changes in the household’s exposure to 
investment risks. With an ordered logit, the dependent variable must not only be 
categorical, but the categories must also be ordinal in nature. Specifically, households 
were placed into one of three categories (1= least risky, 2 = intermediate level of risk, 3 = 
most risky) according to how their DC retirement balances were invested.8 The 
interpretation of ordered logit estimation is similar to the standard logit estimation 
technique in some ways but is also different in other ways. As with the standard logit, the 
actual numerical value of the coefficient estimated from an ordered logit cannot be 
interpreted as a marginal effect, but the sign of the coefficient and the statistical 
significance are important. Because the dependent classification variable used here 
increases in value as the household’s exposure to risk increases, positive (negative) 
parameters indicate a greater (lower) willingness to take on additional risk as the X 
variables increases.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 A household is associated with a 1 if it reports investing all of its DC retirement investments in money or 
bonds, with a 2 if it reports investing in both bonds and stocks, and with a 3 if it reports investing its DC 
retirement investments entirely in stocks.  
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To explain the ordered logit model in more detail, let b be the unknown 
parameters for a vector of explanatory independent variables, X, and let e be the error 
term. Allowing y* to be the latent dependent variable, or in this case, the household’s 
actual market risk exposure, the researcher would like to estimate: 
    y* = bX + e.  
Instead of observing y* directly in the data, however, the researcher only observes the 
household’s risk classification y, where  
      
y = 1 if y* ≤ µ1 
     y = 2 if µ1 ≤ y* ≤  µ2 
     y = 3 if µ2 ≤ y* 
 
 
for some unknown parameters µ1 and µ2, where µ1 < µ2. The ordered logit model, 
therefore, aims to predict or classify each household’s y value by estimating the cut 
points, µ1 and µ2, in addition to estimating the b vector (Sawkins, Seaman, and Williams, 
1997).  
Moreover, according to the ordered logit procedure, the probability of observing 
an outcome of y = 2 can be written as:  
    Pr[yi = 2] = F[µ2 – bX] – F[µ1 – bX] 
where F(x) = 
$+"#$+. This implies:  
    Pr[yi = 2] = 
""#$%µ,)	  b7 –  ""#$%µ*)	  b7. 
Likewise, the probability of observing a y = 1 or a y = 3 adheres to the following format:  
   Pr[yi = 1] = F[µ1 –  bX], and Pr[yi = 3] = 1 –  F[µ2 –  bX], 
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which reflects the fact that y = 1 is in the left tail of the distribution while y = 3 is in the 
right tail of the distribution. Using F(·) function from above, there probabilities can be 
rewritten as: 
   Pr[yi = 1] = 
""#$%µ*)	  b7  and  Pr[yi = 3] = 1 - ""#$%µ,)	  b7 . 
 The three probabilities for Pr[yi = 1] , Pr[yi = 2] , and Pr[yi = 3]  can then be used to derive 
a likelihood function. Specifically,  
L(µ1, µ2, b) =  
""#	  $%µ*)	  b+ ""#	  $%µ,)	  b+ −	   ""#	  $%µ*)	  b7:6; 1 −	   ""#	  $%µ,)	  b7:6=:6"  
A maximum likelihood estimation is then used to derive µ and b (Sawkins, Seaman, and 
Williams, 1997).  
 
IV.   Model (1) Results: Age Cohorts  
Table 2 contains the estimated coefficients for each of the five dependent 
variables for Model (1).  
Pension Balances 
As expected, pension plan balances (a40, a50, and a60), increased significantly 
with age. By the time households were near retirement (55 to 64 years old), pension 
balances were on average 60 percent higher than households of the youngest age cohort 
(25 to 34 year-olds). Following the financial crisis, pension plan balances decreased in 
2013 for 25 to 34 year-olds (a32) and in both 2010 and 2013 for 55 to 64 year-olds (a61 
and a62) compared to before the crisis. Pension balances for households of the ages 25 to 
34 decreased on average by about 22 percent following the financial crash in 2010. 
Households in this age cohort are the farthest away from retirement, and the financial 
crisis could have forced these employees to focus on more relevant financial needs (e.g. 
student loans, rent, mortgages). Pension balances also decreased for households in the 55 
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to 64 year-old age cohort, specifically by about 24 percent, in both years following the 
financial crisis. This age group had the least amount of time to recover from pension 
losses before retirement following the financial crash. There were no differences in short- 
and long-term effects (2010 versus 2013) for household pension balances for any age 
group.  
 
Amount of Income Contributed 
 In general, the amount of income contributed to household pension plans 
consistently increases with age. Pre-financial crisis, 55 to 64 year-old households 
contributed about $1,120 more into their pension accounts compared to households aged 
25 to 34 year-olds (a60). As age increases, households have higher incomes and approach 
retirement, and therefore may start contributing more to their DC plans in order to have a 
steady source of income in retirement. The amount of income contributed to a pension 
plan did also change depending on age following the financial crisis. In 2010, the 45 to 
54 year-old age cohort contributed $821 more into their pension account (a51), while 
employees aged 55 to 64 decreased contributions by $1,194 in 2013 (a62). However, 
there were no differences in short- and long-term effects (e.g., a32 - a31) on the amount of 
income contributed for any age cohort following the financial crisis.  
 
Percent of Income Contributed 
 
 Similar to the amount of income contributed, the percent of income contributed to 
DC pension accounts increases with age. Households of the age 55 to 64, contributed 
approximately 1.55 percentage points more of their income compared to 25 to 34 year-
olds pre-crisis (a60). As age increases, households near retirement, and therefore start 
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contributing higher percentages of their income. Older age groups also have higher levels 
of expected income and are therefore able to contribute more on average to their DC plan. 
However, compared to before the crisis, 55 to 64 year-old households decreased the 
percent of income contributed by about 1.8 and 1.4 percentage points in 2010 and 2013, 
respectively (a61 and a62).9 No other age cohort made significant changes to the percent 
of income contributed after the financial crisis. This decrease in the percent of income 
contributed could be due to decreases in expected income, switching of employers, or 
even job loss.  
 
Participation Rates 
 
 There was no significant relationship between DC participation and age prior to 
the 2008 financial crisis. Individuals in older age cohort have the same likelihood of 
participating in their DC pension plans as younger age cohorts. Likewise, the financial 
crisis affected all age groups in similar ways, particularly because the financial crisis had 
no effect on DC participation rates for any age demographic. Post-financial crisis DC 
participation rates remained consistent with pre-financial crisis participation rates 
following the 2008 financial crash. There was also no difference in 2010 and 2013 
participation rates for any age group. 
 
Exposure to Market Risk 
  Households of the age 35 to 44 tend to invest in riskier assets (investing in 
stocks) compared to 25 to 34 year-olds. There is however, no relationship between age 
and risk exposure for employees over the age 45. Employees older than 45 accumulate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Although the point estimate is less in 2013 compared to 2010 (1.4 versus 1.8), the difference is not 
statistically significant. 
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the same amount of market risk as someone of the age 25 to 34. Furthermore, the SCF 
data suggests that the financial crisis led younger age groups to create even riskier 
investment portfolios following the crisis, while causing older age groups to veer from 
investing in risky assets. Specifically, in 2010, the 25 to 34 year-old age cohort started 
investing in riskier assets (stocks and stocks & bonds), while the 55 to 64 year-old age 
group made “safer” investments (investing more in bonds) compared to before the 
financial crisis.  However, the average levels of risk exposure returned to their pre-crisis 
levels in the long term, as there was no change in the household’s risk exposure for any 
age group in 2013. The simultaneous decreases of pension balances along with a 
shortened length of time before retirement might have caused older age groups to create a 
more diversified investment portfolio following the financial crisis, specifically because 
these households did not have the time or the financial stability to invest in riskier assets 
shortly following the 2008 market crash. Because households eventually returned to the 
same level of market risk as before the financial crisis in 2013, there was a difference in 
2010 and 2013 levels of risk exposure specifically for 25 to 34 year olds who exposed 
themselves to significantly higher levels of market risk in 2010 compared to 2013.  
 
V.   Model (2) Results: Age Cohorts by Income Class  
The empirical results for Model (2) are reported in Table 3 Panel A-D, where 
each panel contains the results for a particular age cohort.  
Pension Balances 
 There is a direct relationship between pension plan balances and income. 
Specifically, as income increases, pension balances increased for each age cohort prior to 
the financial crisis. For example, for the youngest age cohort (25 to 34 year-olds) there is 
a 116 percent difference in pension balances between the middle and lower income 
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classes (l30M). This difference is exaggerated as age increases. Following the 2008 
financial crisis pension plan balances decreased for the middle class of 55 to 64 year-
olds. Specifically, pension balances on average decreased by about 27 and 22 percent in 
2010 and 2013, respectively for this age group (l61M and l62M). In model (1), we saw a 
decrease in pension balances for the 55 to 64 year-old age cohort. Model (2) further 
explains that this decrease occurred predominately within the middle income class. 
Furthermore, there was no change between 2010 and 2013 pension balances for any 
specific age and income class.  
 
Amount of Income Contributed 
 
 Prior to the 2008 financial crash, income had a direct effect on pension plan 
wealth solely within the upper class. The upper class 45 to 54 year-olds had the largest 
difference in the amount of income contributed to their DC account compared to the 
lower class 25 to 34 year-olds. Specifically, they contributed $10,751 more to their 
pension account per year (l60U). These upper level income classes also experienced the 
most significant changes to the amount of income contributed following the financial 
crisis. In 2010, the amount of income contributed increased by about $5,790 for the upper 
class of 55 through 64 year-olds (l61U). Comparatively, in 2013, the amount of income 
contributed to pension plans increased by about $24,789 for the upper class of 25 to 34 
year-olds (l32U), and decreased by approximately $1,551 for 55 to 64 year-olds in the 
middle level of the income distribution (l62M). The short and long term effects of the 
financial crisis on the amount of income contributed to household pension plans were 
significantly different for upper class 25 to 34 year-olds and upper class 55 to 64 year-
olds (l32U - l31U and l62U-l61U). Specifically, the upper class 25 to 34 year-olds drastically 
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increased contributions several years after the financial crisis, while the upper class chose 
to reduce contribution amounts in the long-term.   
 
Percent of Income Contributed 
  Income did not have a relationship with the percent of income contributed to a 
pension plan before the financial crisis. The percent of income contributed to DC 
retirement plans were statistically the same regardless of age and income. However, the 
percent of income contributed to pension plans did decrease following the financial crisis 
for multiple age and income classes. Except for 45 to 54 year-olds, at least one income 
class (particularly the middle and upper class) for each age cohort was associated with a 
lower percent of income contributed to their DC account following the financial crisis. 
The middle class for 25 to 34 year-olds, 35 to 44 year olds, and 55 to 64 year olds all saw 
the percent of income contributed fall by at least 1.27 percentage points in either 2010 
and 2013. The largest decrease in percent of income contributed occurred within the 
upper class of 55 to 64 year olds in 2010 who experienced a 4.25 percentage point 
decrease (l61U). Because the percent of income contributed decreased by roughly the 
same percent in both 2010 and 2013 for each impacted group, there was no difference in 
the short- and long-term effects of the financial crisis on household percent contributions.    
 
Participation Rates 
 
 There was no significant relationship between participation rates and income. 
Employees in the upper level of the income distribution have the same likelihood of 
participating in their DC pension plans as employees in the lower level of the income 
distribution. Similar to Model (1), participation rates for employees in all income specific 
	   28 
age groups remained consistent in both 2010 and 2013. There was also no significant 
difference in the short- and long-term effects of the financial crisis on participation rates.  
 
Exposure to Market Risk 
 
 In general, the level of market risk of DC plans prior to the 2008 financial crisis 
was not related to age or income. Things changed, however, after the crisis. In particular, 
and similar to Model (1), 25 to 34 year olds in the middle class began investing in riskier 
assets (stocks or stocks and bonds) in 2010 compared to their pre-crisis behavior (l31M), 
while 55 to 64 year-olds in the middle class started making “safer” investment decisions 
(investing in bonds). Even though levels of investment risk differed in 2010 and 2013 for 
specific age and income classes, there was no difference in household risk exposure for 
these two years.   
 
VI.   Discussion 
 From the first model, it is clear that the financial crisis had more of an effect on 
households closest to retirement (55 to 64 year-olds) than it had on any other age group. 
Pension balances decreased for this older age cohort more than for any other cohort, and 
employees in this cohort age group also reduced both the percent and the amount of 
income contribution to their pension plans. These results are consistent with the literature. 
Chai, Maurer, Mitchell, and Rogalla (2011) found that individuals on the verge of 
retirement, namely the 55-64 age cohort, are more affected by financial crises than 
younger cohorts. Specifically, following a financial crisis, this age group, more than any 
other, has to drastically alter consumption and retirement plans. They explain that this 
heightened vulnerably is partly due to a shorten adjustment period. Specifically, older 
employees have less time to adjust their savings plans and investment portfolios in order 
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to offset potential capital and labor market losses before retirement (Chai, et al. 2011). 
Younger age groups have several decades to rebound from potential pension balance 
losses, and therefore do not drastically alter their retirement savings behaviors. Thus, it 
could be argued that employees nearing retirement have less time to recover from 
potential decreases in pension wealth and therefore are more likely to change their 
retirement savings behaviors immediately following a financial crash. Butrica and Smith 
(2012) also found that employees in their 50’s and 60’s made significant altercations to 
their retirement savings patterns in response to negative financial shocks. Specifically, 
they found that these employees had the largest decrease in contribution rates as median 
contribution rates fell by 9.3 percent for employees of the ages 50 to 64 years-old 
between 2007 and 2009. Overall, older households were the most affected by the 2008 
financial crisis.  
 It is particularly interesting that households of the youngest age cohort (25 to 34 
year-olds) chose to invest in riskier assets after the financial crisis. This age group might 
have made this investment decision in order to compensate for the loss in pension 
balances following the financial crisis. Post-financial crisis, the stock market was 
yielding high returns. When looking at the historical returns of the S&P 500 index, the 
S&P closed the 2004 year at 1,212, the 2007 year at 1,468, the 2010 year at 1,258, and 
the 2013 year at 1,848. When averaging the pre- and post- years respectively, the S&P 
increased by almost 16 percent. Since more risk generally yields greater returns, younger 
households might have been persuaded to create riskier investment portfolios. However, 
this is not the only explanation. The 2008 financial crisis was caused by an 
overinvestment in real estate that increased the prices of these properties far beyond what 
they were worth. As these unsustainable prices fell, investors began to panic and 
drastically lowered the price of these properties. However, the panic that started in the 
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housing market eventually found its way to the entire stock market and caused the price 
of stocks to fall below their true value. At this point, stocks were significantly 
undervalued and buying these equities would allow for higher returns for investors when 
the stock market recovered following the financial crash. Either way, younger households 
increased risk exposure in hopes of yielding higher returns.  
In contrast, older age groups shifted away from equities and made more 
diversified investment portfolios following the crisis. Since this age group experienced 
the most negative shocks, specifically experiencing large decreases in pension balances, 
it is likely that these employees chose to invest more in less risky assets (bonds) 
following the financial crisis in order to avoid larger potential losses. For comparison, 
post-crisis 25 to 34 year-olds did not have a high accumulation of pension benefits, and 
could afford to make riskier investments, while 55 to 64 year-olds are were near 
retirement and could not afford to lose even more of their pension balances by investing 
in risky assets. Butrica and Smith (2012) found similar results, claiming that older 
employees did not abandon equities, but instead shifted toward a more diverse investment 
portfolio. These losses also drove employees to reduce overall DC pension plan 
contributions. Model (1) and Model (2) both showed a decrease in the amount and the 
percent of income contributed to a pension plan in older households. Households not only 
reduced their risk exposure, but they also lowered their financial holdings in these assets.  
 In addition to supporting results found by others regarding DC balances and 
contribution pre- versus post-financial crisis, the primary original contribution of this 
thesis is to further investigate such changes at different points in the income distribution. 
To this point, the results in model (2) show that the financial crisis had more of an effect 
on wealthy households because these employees had higher pension balances before the 
crisis and therefore had more to lose following the crisis. Butrica, Johnson, and Smith 
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(2012) found evidence that overall wealthier employees will experience greater losses in 
their expected retirement income compared to other income classes. These employees are 
most affected by the negative financial shock because they have greater pension balances 
and therefore more to lose in terms of retirement wealth. Specifically, they found that 
employees in higher income brackets began to decrease contributions by 4.8 percent in 
2010 in response to the financial crisis. However, they attributed most of this decrease in 
contributions to labor mobility. Regardless of the explanation, middle and upper class 
employees with larger losses in pension balances are expected to make more changes to 
their retirement savings behaviors following a financial crisis than are poorer employees.  
It should be noted however, that middle and upper class employees responded to 
the economic contraction in very different ways. Following the financial crisis, older, 
middle class employees experienced the largest decrease in pension balances. This led to 
a reduction in both the percent and the amount of income contributed to pension plans. In 
contrast, the upper class started savings more in dollar amounts into their DC pension 
accounts. Because the upper class has more financial stability, and more consistent 
income, these households can more easily rebound from the financial losses. Specifically, 
they are able to start contributing more into their pension plans to compensate for the 
reduction in pension wealth. The lower classes, however, do not have the financial 
stability or means to offset pension losses immediately following a financial crisis.  
  It is important to realize however, that even despite the decreases in pension 
wealth for older and wealthier income classes, DC participation rates remained stable 
during and following the financial crisis. Even though some age groups might have been 
contributing less on average to their DC account, individuals continued to make 
contributions to their account regardless of the economic conditions. Wray (2012) also 
found this same consistency with DC participants. Specifically, Wray found that DC 
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plans had a 2.5% resignation rate in 2006, which rose to 3.8% in 2008, and then fell back 
to 2.0% in 2010. This consistency also occurred on the employer side as well. 
Specifically, Wray found that no DC plans were terminated, except for companies that 
went bankrupt during the financial crisis, and that three-fourths of companies made no 
changes to their contributions levels. He also noted that another 15 percent of companies 
suspended contribution levels, and an additional four to five percent actually increased 
contribution rates in 2009. In this regard, DC plans appear to be quite resilient to changes 
in economic conditions. This claim is further validated in my results.  
 
VII.   Robustness  
Several robust checks were performed in order to provide more support for the 
overarching conclusions. First, age cohorts were swapped with generational cohorts just 
to make sure the results are not skewed by arbitrarily chosen age groups. Second, income 
classes were replaced with categories of home equity values and interacted with age. 
Because the financial crisis severely affected those with high mortgages, this analysis 
was performed to allow for home equity, the largest component of most households’ net 
worth, rather than income to influence retirement savings behaviors. Third, generational 
cohorts were interacted with income class. Fourth, and finally, generational cohorts were 
interacted with housing equities. Aside from the increase in pension balances for younger 
age cohorts and lower income classes, there was not much difference between the 
original results and those in the robust models.  
 
Robust Check #1: Generational Cohorts  
 
Table 4 contains the estimated coefficients for the five dependent variables when 
using generations rather than age groups in Model (1).  
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Pension Balances 
 Similar to Model (1), pension balances were higher for older generations. 
Specifically, households in the oldest generational cohort (Baby Boomers) were expected 
to have a pension balance that was 125 percent higher than millennial households (the 
youngest generational cohort) prior to the financial crisis. However, the effects of the 
2008 financial crisis on pension balances for generational cohorts were slightly different 
from than those displayed in Model (1). Following the recession, pension balances 
increased for both millennials and generation X households by 53 and 23 percent, 
respectively. This positive difference could primarily be due to an increase in stock 
market activity. As discussed above, in 2013, the stock market experienced much higher 
returns than those in the years preceding the financial crash, which could result in higher 
pension balances for certain generational cohorts. It is important to note, however, that 
even though pension balances increased in 2013 for the identified generational cohorts, 
there was no difference in short- and long- terms effects for any of the generations.  
 
Amount of Income Contributed 
 There was no significant relationship between the amount of income contributed 
and generation. Older generations on average contributed the same amount to their DC 
plan as younger generations. Likewise, the financial crisis did not have a significant 
effect on the amount of income contributed for any generation except for the baby 
boomers. Immediately following the financial crisis, baby boomers started contributing 
$727 more per year on average into their account compared to before the crisis. This is 
consistent with the results in Model (1). The short and long term effects of the financial 
crisis on the amount of income contributed to household pension plans were significantly 
different for the baby boomer as well. Specifically, the baby boomers increased their 
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contributions immediately following the financial crisis, which eventually began to 
decrease in the long-term.  
 
Percent of Income Contributed 
 Similar to the amount of income contributed, the percent of income contributed 
did not vary by generation prior to the financial crisis. The financial crisis, however, did 
have a significant effect on the percent of income contributed for generation X 
households. Specifically, compared to before the crisis, generation X households 
decreased the percent of income contributed by .74 percentage points in both 2010 and 
2013. Because these households decreased the percent of income contributed by the same 
amount in both 2010 and 2013, there was no difference in the short- and long-term effects 
of the financial crisis on generation x employees. This result is consistent with the other 
generations as well.  
 
Participation rates 
 Coinciding with Model (1), there were no significant relationships between 
participation rates and generations. Older generations have the same likelihood of 
participating in their DC pension plan as younger generations. Likewise, the financial 
crisis did not deter households from contributing to their DC retirement plan. Compared 
to before the crisis, each generation had the same likelihood of participating in their 
pension plan after the financial crash. These results are consistent with those in Model (1) 
as well.  Because there was no variance in participation rates pre- and post-financial 
crisis, the short- and long-term effects were identical.  
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Exposure to Market Risk 
 
 In general, the level of market risk of DC plans prior to the 2008 financial crisis 
was not related to a household’s generation. Things changed, however, after the financial 
crisis. Specifically, the baby boomers decreased their level of risk exposure immediately 
following the financial crisis. The level of risk exposure, however, returned to pre-crisis 
levels in the long-term as there was no significant difference between 2013 risk exposure 
and that prior to the financial crisis. Similarly, there was no difference in effects of risk 
exposure in the short- versus long- term for any generational cohort. These results match 
those of Model (1) using age cohorts rather than generation. 
 
Robust Check #2: Age Cohort by Home Equity Value 
The empirical results when interacting home equity values with age are reported 
in Table 5 Panel A-D, where each panel contains the results for a particular age cohort. 
To remain consistent with the previous models, households with high home equity values 
will be referred to as the upper class, those with low home equity values are referred to as 
the lower class, and those in-between are classified as the middle class. Specifically, the 
upper class is defined as households roughly in the top ten percent of home equity value. 
This coincides with a home equity value that is at or above $389,436. Since more than 20 
percent of households have a zero home equity values, more than just the bottom ten 
percent of home equity was used to define the lower class. In order to mimic what was 
done earlier with income, the lower class are those with $30,000 home equity or lower.  
This is roughly the 37th percentile. Moreover, the middle class are those households with 
home equity values in between the upper and lower class.  
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Pension Balances 
 As expected, pension balances increased as age and home equity value increased. 
For example, 55 to 64 year-old households with the highest home equity value had 
pension balances that were 127 percent higher than 25 to 34 year-olds with the lowest 
home equity value. Keeping home value constant, there is a 13 percent difference in 
pension balances between lower class 25 to 34 year-olds and lower class 35 to 44 year-
olds. These results align with those of Model (2). However, the effects of the financial 
crisis on specific age and home equity classes slightly differ from Model (2). Following 
the 2008 financial crisis, pension balances decreased for upper class 25 to 34 year-olds, 
but increased for middle class 25 to 34 year-olds, lower class 35 to 44 year-olds, and 
middle class 45 to 54 year-olds. This increase in pension values could partially be due to 
the increase in stock market return in the years following the financial crisis. Higher 
returns lead to higher pension balances. The short and long-term effects of the financial 
crisis were different only for 25 to 34 year-olds with medium home equity values. 
Pension balances for this age group increased immediately following the financial crisis, 
but began to decline in the long-term.  
 
Amount of Income Contributed 
 
 Prior to the 2008 financial crash, home equity value had a direct effect on pension 
plan wealth solely within the upper class. Particularly, by the time households were of the 
age 55 to 64 those with high home equity values were expected to contribute $4,444 more 
into their DC account per year compared to 25 to 34 year-olds with low home equity 
values. These upper class were also the most influenced the by 2008 financial crisis. In 
2010 upper class 45 to 54 year-olds and upper class 55 to 64 year-olds increased the 
amount of income contributed by $2,276 and $2,944, respectively. The only other age 
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group to alter their savings behaviors following the financial crisis were the middle class 
of 55 to 64 year olds. These households contributed $1,579 less into their account per 
year following the crisis. The short- and long-term effects of the financial crisis differed 
for upper class 45 to 54 year-olds and upper class 55 to 64 year-olds as the amount of 
income contributed increased immediately following the financial crisis but then returned 
to pre-crisis levels in 2013. 
 
Percent of Income Contributed 
 There is not a significant relationship between home equity value and the percent 
of income contributed prior to the financial crisis for households under the age of 55. 
However, for households over the age of 55, income had a direct relationship with the 
percent of income contributed to a DC plan. Following the financial crisis more age and 
home equity classes were affected. Unlike Model (2), 25 to 34 year-olds with low home 
equity values experienced declines in the percent of income contributed in 2010 and 
2013. Similarly, the percent of income contributed fell for the lower class 35 to 44 year 
olds and the upper and middle class 55 to 64 year-olds. Unlike the other cohorts, the 
middle class 35 to 44 year-olds increased contributions immediately following the 
financial crisis. However, this increase only occurred in the short-term as contribution 
rates returned to pre-crisis levels in the long-term. This difference in short- and long-term 
effects only occurred for the middle class of 35 to 44 year-olds.  
 
Participation Rates 
 There was not a significant relationship between DC participation and home 
equity value prior to the 2008 financial crisis. Regardless of their home equity values, 
households of all ages have the same likelihood of participating in their DC pension 
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plans. Likewise, the financial crisis had no effect on DC participation rates for any 
cohort. Post-financial crisis DC participation rates remained consistent with pre-financial 
crisis participation rates following the 2008 financial crash. There was also no difference 
in 2010 and 2013 participation rates for all cohorts as well.  These results align with those 
in Model (1) and (2).  
 
Exposure to Market Risk 
 Employees with higher home equity values took on significantly more risky 
investment portfolios for all age groups prior to the financial crisis. Following the 
financial crisis, however, households with higher home equity values decreased their risk 
exposure, while households with lower home equity values began increasing market risk. 
For each age and home equity class, there was no difference in 2010 and 2013 risk 
exposure. These results are consistent with those in Model (2) using income instead of 
home equity values.  
 
Robust Check #3: Generational Cohorts by Income Class 
 The results from interacting generational cohort with income classes are reported 
in Table 6, Panel A-D, where each panel states the results for all five dependent variables 
relating to a particular generational cohort. 
Pension Balances 
 
 Prior to the 2008 financial crisis, income had a significant effect on employee 
pension balances. Specifically, middle class millennials have, on average, pension 
balances that are 185 percent greater than lower class millennials. Such differences grow 
substantially larger for the older generations. However, only the middle class of the 
younger generations experienced changes in pension balances due to the financial crisis. 
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Particularly, pension balances increased by 57 percent for middle class millennials in 
2013 and similarly by 23 percent for middle class generation X households. No other 
income and generational cohort was affected by the negative financial shock. These 
results slightly differ from those reported in Model (2).  
 
Amount of Income Contributed 
 Income levels did not have a significant relationship with the amount of income 
contributed to employee pension plans for any generation before the 2008 financial crisis. 
Upper class households contributed roughly the same amount as lower class households. 
Similarly, there was no difference in the amount of income contributed pre- and post-
financial crisis for any particular income and generational cohort.  
  
Percent of Income Contributed 
 There was no significant relationship between income and the percent of income 
contributed to employee pension plans. Different from the results in Model (2), 
households with lower incomes contributed the same percent of their income into their 
DC plans as households with higher incomes. Likewise, the financial crisis had no effect 
on the percent of income contributed for any generation and income class. Moreover, the 
percent of income contributed after the financial crisis was consistent with pre-financial 
crisis contribution rates for each cohort, nor were there any significant differences 
between short- and long-term effects of the financial crisis on the percent of income 
contributed. 
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Participation Rates 
 Identical to the preceding models, income had no effect on participation rates. 
Households in the upper class have the same likelihood of participating in their DC plan 
as someone in the lower class. Similarly, the financial crisis only affected the 
participation rates of the baby boomers in the middle class. Even though participation 
rates fell for baby boomers in the middle class in 2013, there was no difference in short- 
and long-term effects for any generation or income class. Apart from the decrease in 
participation for baby boomers, these results align with those in Model (2).  
 
Exposure to Market Risk 
 Risk exposure did not have a significant relationship with income. Households in 
the upper, middle, and lower class generally took on the same level of market risk. The 
financial crisis, however, did affect two particular income and generational cohorts, the 
lower class millennials and the middle class baby boomers, although in very different 
ways: following the financial crisis, lower class millennials increased their risk exposure, 
while middle class baby boomers lowered their risk exposure. As shown in Table 4, 
pension balances increased for millennials following the financial crisis which could have 
caused them to start making riskier investment decisions. Even though these groups 
altered their risk exposure solely in 2010, there was no difference in the short- and long-
term effects. 
 
Robust Check #4: Generational Cohorts by Home Equity Value 
 The empirical results from interacting generations with home equity value are 
displayed in Table 7, Panel A-D, where each panel reports the results for all five 
dependent variables for a particular generation. 
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Pension balances 
 As home equity values increased, pension balances for each generation increased. 
Baby boomers with the highest home equity values had pension balances that were 200 
percent higher than millennials with low home equity values on average. These results 
are consistent with those in the preceding models. The financial crisis also had a 
significant effect on pension balances with increased pension balances for lower class 
millennials, middle class generation X, and lower class generation X households in 2010 
and/or 2013. The upper class of each generation was not affected by the financial crisis. 
There was also no difference in short- and long-term effects for any home equity and 
generational cohort. These results differ from those in Model (2).  
 
Amount of Income Contributed 
 Prior to the 2008 financial crisis, home equity value influenced the amount of 
income contributed for baby boomer households. Baby boomers with large amounts of 
home equity were also the only generation that was affected by the financial crisis. By 
2013, however, the amount of income contributed by this group had returned to pre-
financial crisis levels. These results align with those in Model (2).  
 
Percent of Income Contributed 
 Home equity value had no effect on the percent of income contributed prior to the 
2008 financial crisis. The financial crisis only negatively affected households with low 
home equity values. Lower class generation X households decreased the percent of 
income contributed by 1.00, and .94 percentage points in 2010 and 2013, respectively. 
Similarly, lower class baby boomers reduced contribution rates by 1.11 percentage 
points. Households with high and medium home equity values were not significantly 
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affected by the financial crisis. Regardless of home equity value, there was no difference 
in short and long term effects for any generational cohort.  
 
Participation Rates 
 Regardless of home equity value, households of all generations had the same 
likelihood of participating in their DC pension plan prior to the financial crisis. The 
financial crisis, however, had much more of an effect on participation rates for baby 
boomers than in the preceding models. Specifically, participation rates increased in 2010 
for baby boomers with high home equity values and decreased for middle class baby 
boomers in both 2010 and 2013. It is important to note, however, that participation rates 
only changed for households with higher home equity values, the lower class was not 
affected in any generation. There was also no difference in short and long term effects for 
any cohort.  
 
Exposure to Market Risk 
There was no relationship between home equity value and risk exposure. 
Investment portfolios were the same in terms of risk exposure for each generation and 
home equity class. There began to be a difference in risk exposure, however, following 
the financial crisis. The baby boomers were the generation that was most negatively 
affected by the financial crisis, with both upper and middle class baby boomers becoming 
more diversified following the financial crisis. These results are consistent with those in 
preceding analyses. This generation is the oldest and because of their shorten adjustment 
period the financial crisis caused these households to divert market risk. There is a 
difference in short- and long-term effects for the upper class baby boomers, with market 
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risk returning to pre-financial crisis levels by 2013. This difference, however, is non-
existent within the other generational cohorts.  
 
VIII.   Conclusions 
 Despite the decreases in pension balances, the amount of income contributed, and 
the percent of income contributed for older age cohorts, DC savings behaviors for other 
age cohorts were not significantly impacted by the 2008 financial crisis. Participation 
rates remained stable, and employees generally did not make significant changes to the 
amount or the percent of earnings contributed to their DC accounts. I argue that older 
employees would have experienced decreases in pension wealth regardless of their 
pension plan type simply because they have the most accumulated benefits and therefore 
have the most to lose following the 2008 financial crisis. In contrast, it can be argued that 
younger employees had even more faith in the DC pension plan system following the 
economic crash as this age group (25 to 34 year-olds) started investing in riskier assets. 
Likewise, the upper income households also started contributing greater amounts into 
their pension accounts following the financial crisis. Thus, it can be argued that the 
financial crisis led certain households to a greater trust in not only the stock market, but 
in DC pension plans.  
 The change from a DB to a DC pension plan system created much controversy in 
the United States. DC plans significantly shifted the financial risk from the employer to 
the employee and left employees predominately in charge of investment decisions. With 
this shift, many worried that pension balances would decrease due to a lack of financial 
literacy for the average employee. However, the opposite effect occurred, and pension 
balances grew to surpass benefits accumulated in DB plans (Samwick and Skinner 2004). 
Regardless of their benefits, critics still argued that DC plans would not survive 
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aggressive recessionary periods. From this analysis, however, DC plans specifically, and 
employees’ retirement savings behaviors in general remain consistent throughout 
economic contractions for several age cohorts. With these results, I argue that DC plans 
are particularly resilient to changes in economic conditions, and they can indeed survive a 
financial crisis. 
 Despite the strong and consistent results using four waves of the Survey of 
Consumer Finances and estimating several models along with some robust checks, there 
are still opportunities to improve the thesis. Specifically, a more careful check for 
robustness within the upper, middle, and lower classes would be a useful addition in 
order to eliminate any sort of unobserved bias within the social classes. The same could 
be done for home equity values. For example, an additional model using household net 
worth instead of income or home equity values could provide further evidence that 
households with DC plans responded appropriately regardless of wealth. An additional 
section describing the results on the effect of household demographic and financial 
variables on retirement savings behaviors would also be an interesting addition to this 
thesis. A more formal analysis such as this would help identify the effects of factors other 
than age and income class on household retirement savings. Likewise, this analysis could 
also be extended to include retired households by looking at the differences in DC 
pension account withdraws for retired households throughout the recessionary period. In 
fact, I had originally planned to do just this, but when I started this part of the project I 
quickly realized that the SCF wasn’t detailed enough to isolate different parts of 
households’ retirement income.  
Moreover, for future research, it would be beneficial to study how the 
characteristics of the DC plans themselves changed during the 2008 financial crisis.  
Specifically, I wonder how the financial crisis affected employers’ perspectives and 
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would like to identify changes in employer retirement savings behaviors pre- and post-
financial crisis. For example, did employer participation rates, match rates, or 
contributions levels change following the financial crisis. A broader study would help 
understand the impact of recessionary periods on the DC pension plan system as a whole. 
Right now, this analysis is limited to the employee’s point of view. Adding the 
employer’s perspective would enrich the impact of this analysis. 
Of course, the gold standard would be to use a panel data set. This would allow 
me to study how individuals altered their retirement savings behaviors pre- and post- 
crisis, which would be most valuable for the risk exposure regressions. Alas, no such 
dataset exists to date with the financial details of the SCFs. It would also be interesting to 
study how changes in employer contributions affected employee retirement savings 
behaviors. For example, how did the firm’s decision to stop contributing to DC pension 
accounts affect employee’s retirement savings behaviors? Even looking at how changes 
in employee’s salaries affected retirement savings decisions would be an interesting 
question to analyze. However, answering these questions are only possible if the study is 
performed on an individual level.  
Going forward, I hope this thesis helps explain the many benefits associated with 
a DC pension plan system, especially to public-sector unions. DC plans are significantly 
less popular among public-sector unions. Poterba (2007) explains that 62% of public-
sector plans have no DC assets, and less than 11% of all DC assets are held by public-
sector employees. Likewise, I hope this analysis persuades the federal government to 
authorize a higher annual contribution limit for DC pension plans. As mentioned earlier, 
the annual limit has been $18,000, or $24,000 depending on age, for the last three years. 
The results of this analysis show that DC employee retirement savings behaviors along 
with the actual value of the DC plan do not heavily fluctuate during recessionary periods. 
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Raising the contribution limit would eliminate the fear that DC plans do not provide 
stable retirement replacement rates for income.  
It can be concluded from this thesis that DC pension plans provide many benefits 
that DB plans cannot. More specifically, the results conclude that DC pension plans, in 
regard to employee retirement savings behaviors, are not impacted by recessionary 
periods.  
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Table 1: Summary Statistics (n = 5,102) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent Variables for DC 
Plans     
DC Pension Balance ($) 211,659 616,635 0 15,600,000 
DC Percent of Income Contr. 7.245 7.638 0 100 
DC Amt ($) of Income Contr.  5,215 20,533 0 584,379 
DC Participation Rate 0.092 0.297 0 1 
DC Allocation 2.553 0.941 1 3 
    -HH Invs in All bond 0.220 0.414 0 1 
    -HH Invs in All stocks 0.107 0.309 0 1 
    -HH Invs in Stocks & Bonds 0.574 0.494 0 1 
Diff-In-Diff Variables     
SCF Year 2004 0.166 0.372 0 1 
SCF Year 2007 0.183 0.387 0 1 
SCF Year 2010 0.338 0.473 0 1 
SCF Year 2013 0.313 0.464 0 1 
Age Class 25-34  0.159 0.365 0 1 
Age Class 35-44  0.254 0.435 0 1 
Age Class 45-54 0.335 0.472 0 1 
Age Class 55-64 0.252 0.434 0 1 
Income Class: Lower 0.040 0.196 0 1 
Income Class: Middle 0.765 0.424 0 1 
Income Class: Upper  0.195 0.396 0 1 
Demographic Variables     
Head of HH Sex     
     -Male 0.861 0.346 0 1 
     -Female  0.138 0.346 0 1 
Age 46.399 10.137 25 64 
Married 0.766 0.423 0 1 
Single Female 0.135 0.341 0 1 
Single Male  0.099 0.299 0 1 
White 0.845 0.362 0 1 
African American 0.092 0.289 0 1 
Hispanic 0.063 0.244 0 1 
No High School Degree 0.041 0.197 0 1 
High School Degree 0.212 0.409 0 1 
Some College 0.207 0.405 0 1 
College 0.292 0.455 0 1 
Advanced Degree 0.248 0.432 0 1 
# Kids in HH under 18 0.897 1.169 0 8 
Financial Variables     
Income 1,056 8,041 0 359,833 
Net Worth 697,367 3,652,421 -1,760,510 833,000,000 
Household Owns a Business 0.284 0.451 0 1 
Home Equity 520 1807 -26,665 64,986 
Have filed for Bankrupt 0.109 0.311 0 1 
Self-Reported Risk Adverse 2.842 0.806 1 4 
# of year in DC Plan  10.625 8.638 0 45 
Risky Investor 0.314 0.464 0 1 
Average Risk Investor 0.479 0.500 0 1 
Not a Risky Investor 0.207 0.405 0 1 
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Table 2: Model 1 Results 
 OLS OLS OLS Logit Ordered Logit 
 Natural Log 
Pension 
Balances 
Amount of 
Income 
Contributed 
Percent of 
Income 
Contributed 
Participation 
Rates Risk Exposure 𝞪31 -0.152 -40 -0.467 -0.226 0.424 
 0.122 0.931 0.527 0.429 0.020* 𝞪32 -0.218 -231 -0.754 -0.087 0.047 
    0.027* 0.615 0.312 0.775 0.807 𝞪32 - 𝞪31 -0.066 -191 -0.287 0.139 -0.377 
 0.537 0.704 0.734 0.627 0.043* 𝞪40 0.362 149 0.348 0.014 0.426 
 0.000** 0.696 0.527 0.959 0.011* 𝞪41 0.090 68 0.191 0.042 -0.225 
 0.297 0.866 0.733 0.862 0.121 𝞪42 0.051 -60 -0.613 -0.313 -0.172 
 0.550 0.881 0.271 0.172 0.241 𝞪42 - 𝞪41 -0.038 -128 -0.804 -0.355 0.053 
 0.686 0.775 0.203 0.139 0.724 𝞪50 0.400 57 -0.449 -0.040 0.178 
 0.000** 0.884 0.424 0.882 0.278 𝞪51 0.111 821 0.205 -0.093 -0.105 
 0.163 0.026* 0.674 0.651 0.404 𝞪52 0.108 535 0.097 -0.257 0.013 
 0.187 0.166 0.853 0.211 0.918 𝞪52 - 𝞪51 -0.003 -287 -0.108 -0.164 0.118 
 0.977 0.488 0.848 0.417 0.359 𝞪60 0.602 1,120 1.549 -0.248 0.265 
 0.000** 0.014* 0.016* 0.388 0.144 𝞪61 -0.239 -250 -1.847 -0.047 -0.408 
 0.019* 0.602 0.003** 0.841 0.007** 𝞪62 -0.240 -1,194 -1.359 -0.067 -0.234 
 0.013* 0.008** 0.021* 0.770 0.121 𝞪62 - 𝞪61 -0.001 -944 0.488 -0.020 0.175 
 0.992 0.051 0.442 0.927 0.225 
      
Cut 1     -1.644 
Cut 2     1.581 
      
# of Obs. 5,07210 4,60311 4,603 5,102 4,597 
R2/Pseudo 
R2 
0.4783 0.1914 0.1168 0.0238 0.0234 
      
	  	   *Significant at 5% , ** Significant at 1%. P-values are reported under estimated coefficients. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  Regression for logged pension balances omits the thirty households that reported having a zero pension 
balances.	  
11 Both the percent and the amount of income contributed are restricted to employees who are currently 
making contributions to their account. This reduces the sample size for each of these dependent variables 
from 5,102 to 4,603 for each regression.	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Table 3: Model 2 - Panel A: 25-34 Age Cohort 
 OLS OLS OLS Logit Ordered Logit 
 Natural Log 
Pension 
Balances 
Amount of 
Income 
Contributed 
Percent of 
Income 
Contributed 
Participation 
Rates Risk Exposure 
l30L - - - - - 
 - - - - - 
l31L -0.554 -307 -1.920 -0.603 0.714 
 0.193 0.879 0.410 0.528 0.352 
l32L -0.511 -687 -1.839 -0.725 -0.116 
 0.132 0.680 0.339 0.420 0.874 
l32L - l31L 0.043 -380 0.081 -0.122 -0.830 
 0.920 0.854 0.973 0.870 0.195 
l30M 1.168 -438 0.003 0.151 0.057 
 0.000** 0.712 0.998 0.850 0.927 
l31M -0.176 -178 -0.943 -0.168 0.436 
 0.077 0.698 0.075 0.575 0.022* 
l32M -0.149 -345 -1.273 0.092 0.067 
 0.140 0.456 0.017* 0.783 0.742 
l32M - l31M 0.027 -167 -0.331 0.260 -0.369 
 0.808 0.740 0.570 0.412 0.061 
l30U 1.663 370 3.393 - 0.722 
 0.015* 0.903 0.333 - 0.426 
l31U 1.744 8,084 -9.689 - -0.556 
 0.110 0.093 0.081 - 0.611 
l32U 0.990 24,789 -3.446 - 13.229 
 0.533 0.000** 0.671 - 0.977 
l32U - l31U -0.754 16,705 6.243 - 13.786 
 0.659 0.027* 0.473 - 0.976 
      
Cut 1     -1.562 
Cut 2     1.667 
      
# of Obs.  5,072 4,603 4,603 5,08712 4,59713 
R2/Pseudo 
R2 
0.4993 0.2412 0.1323 0.0298 0.0266 
      
	  	  	  *Significant at 5% , ** Significant at 1%. P-values are reported under estimated coefficients. 
	  
	  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 There were only 15 households in the Upper class of 25 to 34 year-olds. Due to this limited number of 
observations, those households were eliminated from this study and the sample size of this regression was 
reduced from 5,102 to 5,087.	  
13	  Those who invested in other forms of assets were dropped from this regression and therefore the number 
of observations was reduced to 4,597. 
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Table 3: Model 2- Panel B: 35-44 Age Cohort 
 OLS OLS OLS Logit Ordered Logit 
 Natural Log 
Pension 
Balances 
Amount of 
Income 
Contributed 
Percent of 
Income 
Contributed 
Participation 
Rates Risk Exposure 
l40L -0.254 501 1.076 -0.099 1.496 
 0.521 0.786 0.613 0.927 0.082 
l41L 0.618 -531 -2.557 -0.477 -0.916 
 0.155 0.799 0.289 0.620 0.249 
l42L 0.709 -468 -2.016 -0.630 -1.078 
 0.095 0.820 0.397 0.500 0.174 
l42L - l41L 0.091 63 0.541 -0.153 -0.162 
 0.826 0.976 0.823 0.846 0.819 
l40M 1.517 -234 0.436 0.184 0.518 
 0.000** 0.842 0.748 0.815 0.395 
l41M 0.079 -145 -0.355 0.059 -0.239 
 0.361 0.718 0.442 0.820 0.131 
l42M 0.037 -217 -1.271 -0.198 -0.224 
 0.668 0.590 0.006** 0.436 0.163 
l42M - l41M -0.042 -72 -0.916 -0.258 0.014 
 0.665 0.872 0.078 0.328 0.931 
l40U 2.362 7,160 -0.722 0.569 0.380 
 0.000** 0.000** 0.724 0.529 0.561 
l41U 0.410 1,667 -0.713 0.936 -0.191 
 0.448 0.487 0.797 0.402 0.661 
l42U 0.530 105 2.445 -0.654 0.310 
 0.239 0.959 0.297 0.327 0.443 
l42U - l41U 0.120 -1,562 3.158 -1.590 0.501 
 0.833 0.537 0.280 0.157 0.298 
      
Cut 1     -1.562 
Cut 2     1.667 
      
# of Obs.  5,072 4,603 4,603 5,087 4,597 
R2/Pseudo 
R2 
0.4993 0.2412 0.1323 0.0298 0.0266 
      
   *Significant at 5% , ** Significant at 1%. P-values are reported under estimated coefficients. 
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Table 3: Model 2 – Panel C: 45-54 Age Cohort 
 OLS OLS OLS Logit Ordered Logit 
 Natural Log 
Pension 
Balances 
Amount of 
Income 
Contributed 
Percent of 
Income 
Contributed 
Participation 
Rates Risk Exposure 
l50L 0.777 247 -2.107 -0.556 0.062 
 0.072 0.904 0.375 0.617 0.951 
l51L -0.327 -251 0.095 -0.151 0.331 
 0.498 0.915 0.972 0.874 0.719 
l52L -0.391 -977 1.761 1.487 -0.470 
 0.404 0.657 0.489 0.257 0.621 
l52L – l51L -0.064 -726 1.666 1.638 -0.801 
 0.884 0.731 0.495 0.155 0.227 
l50M 1.536 -503 -0.016 0.237 0.210 
 0.000** 0.670 0.991 0.764 0.731 
l51M 0.101 715 -0.171 -0.228 -0.064 
 0.213 0.056 0.693 0.355 0.668 
l52M 0.110 374 -0.211 -0.464 0.057 
 0.188 0.338 0.640 0.057 0.711 
l52M – l51M 0.009 -341 -0.040 -0.236 0.121 
 0.919 0.419 0.934 0.296 0.416 
l50U 2.227 10,752 -0.903 0.137 0.433 
 0.000** 0.000** 0.623 0.867 0.490 
l51U 0.352 -2,282 -0.634 0.551 -0.227 
 0.280 0.124 0.711 0.235 0.363 
l52U 0.401 -907 -1.480 0.234 0.015 
 0.259 0.581 0.435 0.599 0.951 
l52U – l51U 0.049 1,375 -0.846 -0.317 0.243 
 0.891 0.401 0.659 0.554 0.383 
      
Cut 1     -1.562 
Cut 2     1.667 
      
# of Obs. 5,072 4,603 4,603 5,087 4,597 
R2/Pseudo 
R2 
0.4993 0.2412 0.1323 0.0298 0.0266 
      
   *Significant at 5% , ** Significant at 1%. P-values are reported under estimated coefficients. 
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Table 3: Model 2 Results- Panel D: 55-64 Age Cohort 
 OLS OLS OLS Logit Ordered Logit 
 Natural Log 
Pension 
Balances 
Amount of 
Income 
Contributed 
Percent of 
Income 
Contributed 
Participation 
Rates Risk Exposure 
l60L 1.500 -464 -0.679 -0.331 -0.012 
 0.002** 0.847 0.807 0.805 0.991 
l61L -0.292 -238 -1.270 0.057 0.124 
 0.611 0.932 0.695 0.964 0.905 
l62L -0.683 403 -0.027 -0.660 0.349 
 0.189 0.877 0.993 0.590 0.742 
l62L - l61L -0.392 641 1.243 -0.718 0.225 
 0.415 0.788 0.652 0.387 0.748 
l60M 1.720 706 1.945 0.054 0.396 
 0.000** 0.558 0.162 0.947 0.521 
l61M -0.274 -881 -1.977 -0.237 -0.440 
 0.009** 0.073 0.001** 0.421 0.021 
l62M -0.224 -1,551 -1.416 -0.170 -0.339 
 0.025* 0.001** 0.008** 0.565 0.073 
l62M - 
l61M 0.050 -669 0.560 0.067 0.102 
 0.636 0.178 0.329 0.805 0.563 
l60U 2.462 7,665 1.578 -0.126 0.384 
 0.000** 0.000** 0.397 0.878 0.545 
l61U 0.172 5,791 -4.246 0.372 -0.477 
 0.631 0.000** 0.023* 0.375 0.067 
l62U -0.082 1,833 -3.839 0.300 -0.103 
 0.826 0.277 0.049* 0.463 0.692 
l62U - l61U -0.254 -3,957 0.407 -0.072 0.373 
 0.519 0.027* 0.844 0.875 0.171 
      
Cut 1     -1.562 
Cut 2     1.667 
       
# of Obs.  5,072 4,603 4,603 5,087 4,597 
R2/Pseudo 
R2 
0.4993 0.2412 0.1323 0.0298 0.0266 
      
	  	  	  *Significant at 5% , ** Significant at 1%. P-values are reported under estimated coefficients. 
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Table 4: Generational Cohort Results 
 OLS OLS OLS Logit Ordered Logit 
 
Natural Log 
Pension 
Balances 
Amount of 
Income 
Contributed 
Percent of 
Income 
Contributed 
Participation 
Rates Risk Exposure 𝞪M1 0.353 -40 -1.198 -0.290 -0.031 
 0.160 0.973 0.358 0.718 0.948 𝞪M2 0.540 -157 -1.495 -0.105 -0.213 
 0.022* 0.884 0.220 0.894 0.650 𝞪M1 – 𝞪M2 0.187 -118 -0.297 0.185 -0.181 
 
0.224 0.868 0.710 0.637 0.485 𝞪G 1.034 293 0.610 0.015 -0.025 
 
0.000** 0.774 0.598 0.984 0.956 𝞪G1 0.138 36 -0.742 -0.035 0.027 
 
0.051 0.911 0.041* 0.867 0.833 𝞪G2 0.231 268 -0.746 -0.224 -0.065 
 0.001** 0.406 0.041* 0.274 0.610 𝞪G2 – 𝞪G1 0.093 232 -0.005 -0.189 -0.092 
 
0.209 0.495 0.991 0.319 0.442 𝞪B 1.259 409 0.402 -0.111 -0.045 
 0.000** 0.689 0.727 0.883 0.920 𝞪B1 -0.004 727 -0.558 -0.153 -0.289 
 
0.944 0.012* 0.087 0.322 0.003** 𝞪B2 -0.073 -179 -0.491 -0.306 -0.146 
 
0.266 0.556 0.155 0.057 0.161 𝞪B2 – 𝞪B1 -0.069 -906 0.067 -0.152 0.143 
 0.338 0.007** 0.858 0.338 0.169 
      
Cut 1     -1.952 
Cut 2     1.292 
      
# of Obs. 4,930 4,476 4,476 4,960 4,471 
R2/Pseudo 
R2 0.4801 0.1971 0.1211 0.0255 0.0162 
      
*Significant at 5% , ** Significant at 1%. P-values are reported under estimated coefficients.  
 M – Millennials, G – Generation X, B - Baby Boomers (Generational Cohorts replaced Age Cohorts). 
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Table 5: Age by Home Equity Cohort Results – Panel A 25 to 34 Age Cohort 
 OLS OLS OLS Logit Ordered Logit 
 
Natural Log 
Pension 
Balances 
Amount of 
Income 
Contributed 
Percent of 
Income 
Contributed 
Participation 
Rates Risk Exposure 
l30L - - - - - 
 - - - - - 
l31L -0.164 -263 -1.267 -0.149 0.701 
 
0.117 0.600 0.022* 0.627 0.000** 
l32L -0.152 -299 -1.500 -0.009 0.376 
 0.151 0.553 0.007** 0.978 0.036* 
l32L - l31L 0.012 -36 -0.233 0.140 -0.325 
 0.914 0.945 0.692 0.639 0.079 
l30M 0.372 231 -0.712 0.490 0.776 
 0.014* 0.744 0.364 0.447 0.002** 
l31M 0.596 1,933 0.515 -0.655 0.304 
 0.050* 0.180 0.747 0.497 0.534 
l32M -0.265 -642 -0.961 -0.515 -0.175 
 0.333 0.618 0.500 0.589 0.683 
l32M - l31M -0.861 -2,575 -1.476 0.140 -0.479 
 0.018* 0.135 0.439 0.895 0.409 
l30U 0.669 1,519 1.134 0.240 1.390 
 0.090 0.397 0.568 0.823 0.034* 
l31U 0.212 -5,675 -4.033 - 1.792 
 0.860 0.299 0.505 - 0.447 
l32U -1.967 1,379 1.516 - 1.123 
 0.021* 0.722 0.724 - 0.552 
l32U - l31U -2.179 7,053 5.549 - -0.669 
 0.112 0.257 0.421 - 0.811 
      
Cut 1     -1.411 
Cut 2     1.819 
      
# of Obs. 5,072 4,603 4,603 5,095 4,957 
R2/Pseudo 
R2 
0.4981 0.1969 0.1467 0.0303 0.0232 
      
*Significant at 5% , ** Significant at 1%. P-values are reported under estimated coefficients.  
 
	   55 
Table 5: Age by Home Equity Cohort Results – Panel B 35 to 44 Age Cohort 
 OLS OLS OLS Logit Ordered Logit 
 
Natural Log 
Pension 
Balances 
Amount of 
Income 
Contributed 
Percent of 
Income 
Contributed 
Participation 
Rates Risk Exposure 
l40L 0.133 161 0.012 0.002 0.592 
 0.191 0.740 0.982 0.996 0.001** 
l41L 0.254 -175 -1.021 0.181 -0.103 
 0.019* 0.733 0.073 0.568 0.565 
l42L 0.233 -177 -1.196 -0.326 -0.176 
 
0.030* 0.731 0.036* 0.274 0.322 
l42L - l41L -0.021 -2 -0.175 -0.508 -0.073 
 
0.850 0.997 0.767 0.075 0.693 
l40M 0.837 719 0.587 0.238 0.938 
 0.000** 0.165 0.306 0.531 0.000** 
l41M 0.135 14 1.711 -0.204 -0.399 
 0.384 0.985 0.037* 0.655 0.147 
l42M 0.084 -563 -0.638 0.169 -0.104 
 0.609 0.465 0.455 0.758 0.181 
l42M - l41M -0.051 -577 -2.350 0.373 0.295 
 
0.791 0.529 0.021* 0.521 0.983 
l40U 1.224 2,692 1.296 0.236 1.186 
 0.000** 0.001** 0.136 0.587 0.000** 
l41U -0.064 1,714 -2.271 0.101 -0.405 
 0.862 0.324 0.238 0.885 0.489 
l42U 0.220 2,020 -0.505 -0.335 -0.555 
 0.453 0.142 0.740 0.570 0.258 
l42U - l41U 0.285 306 1.766 -0.436 -0.150 
 0.499 0.877 0.422 0.569 0.826 
      
      
Cut 1     -1.411 
Cut 2     1.819 
      
# of Obs. 5,072 4,603 4,603 5,095 4,957 
R2/Pseudo 
R2 
.4981 0.1969 0.1467 0.0303 0.0232 
      
*Significant at 5% , ** Significant at 1%. P-values are reported under estimated coefficients.  
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Table 5: Age by Home Equity Cohort Results – Panel C 45 to 54 Age Cohort 
 OLS OLS OLS Logit Ordered Logit 
 
Natural Log 
Pension 
Balances 
Amount of 
Income 
Contributed 
Percent of 
Income 
Contributed 
Participation 
Rates 
Risk 
Exposure 
l50L 0.274 76 -0.687 0.154 0.128 
 0.017* 0.889 0.255 0.686 0.507 
l51L 0.048 -160 -0.858 -0.190 0.423 
 0.695 0.786 0.187 0.603 0.038* 
l52L 0.090 439 -0.501 -0.546 0.397 
 
0.453 0.452 0.438 0.117 0.049* 
l52L - l51L 0.042 599 0.357 -0.356 -0.026 
 0.727 0.302 0.579 0.215 0.893 
l50M 0.653 211 0.040 0.461 0.537 
 0.000** 0.667 0.941 0.234 0.002** 
l51M 0.213 1,068 0.832 -0.685 -0.422 
 0.077 0.062 0.189 0.074 0.039 
l52M 0.278 1,154 1.000 -0.537 -0.147 
 0.030* 0.057 0.136 0.191 0.491 
l52M - l51M 0.066 86 0.169 0.147 0.275 
 0.646 0.900 0.823 0.690 0.253 
l50U 1.209 4,598 0.984 -0.184 0.677 
 0.000** 0.000** 0.186 0.583 0.004** 
l51U 0.260 2,277 -0.373 0.506 -0.057 
 0.186 0.013* 0.714 0.178 0.858 
l52U 0.386 -1,938 -2.160 0.471 0.037 
 0.127 0.102 0.100 0.263 0.928 
l52U - l51U 0.127 -4,215 -1.787 -0.035 0.094 
 0.642 0.001** 0.204 0.942 0.831 
      
Cut 1     -1.411 
Cut 2     1.819 
      
# of Obs. 5,072 4,603 4,603 5,095 4,957 
R2/Pseudo 
R2 
.4981 0.1969 0.1467 0.0303 0.0232 
      
*Significant at 5% , ** Significant at 1%. P-values are reported under estimated coefficients.  
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Table 5: Age by Home Equity Cohort Results – Panel D 55 to 64 Age Cohort 
 OLS OLS OLS Logit Ordered Logit 
 
Natural Log 
Pension 
Balances 
Amount of 
Income 
Contributed 
Percent of 
Income 
Contributed 
Participation 
Rates Risk Exposure 
l60L 0.598 350 -1.321 -0.417 -0.127 
 0.000** 0.646 0.117 0.344 0.624 
l61L -0.231 -444 -0.129 -0.126 0.385 
 0.215 0.630 0.900 0.778 0.208 
l62L -0.323 -368 0.252 0.068 0.640 
 0.062 0.665 0.789 0.880 0.026* 
l62L - l61L -0.092 76 0.381 0.194 0.255 
 0.585 0.927 0.677 0.607 0.355 
l60M 0.744 1,869 2.186 0.478 0.653 
 0.000** 0.001** 0.001** 0.304 0.006** 
l61M -0.224 -1,244 -2.220 -0.816 -0.315 
 0.124 0.071 0.004** 0.080 0.211 
l62M -0.126 -1,580 -1.551 -0.754 -0.350 
 0.361 0.016* 0.032* 0.108 0.148 
l62M - l61M 0.097 -335 0.669 0.062 -0.035 
 0.507 0.633 0.390 0.864 0.886 
l60U 1.272 4,445 4.326 -0.284 1.187 
 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.417 0.000** 
l61U -0.112 2,944 -2.863 0.787 -1.001 
 0.601 0.003** 0.009** 0.055 0.004** 
l62U -0.145 -1,264 -0.937 0.330 -1.084 
 0.516 0.228 0.419 0.354 0.003** 
l62U - l61U -0.033 -4,208 1.926 -0.457 -0.083 
 0.897 0.000** 0.140 0.306 0.854 
      
Cut 1     -1.411 
Cut 2     1.819 
      
# of Obs. 5,072 4,603 4,603 5,095 4,957 
R2/Pseudo 
R2 
.4981 0.1969 0.1467 0.0303 0.0232 
      
*Significant at 5% , ** Significant at 1%. P-values are reported under estimated coefficients.  
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Table 6: Generation by Income Class Cohort Results: Panel A - Millennials14 
 OLS OLS OLS Logit Ordered Logit 
 
Natural Log 
Pension 
Balances 
Amount of 
Income 
Contributed 
Percent of 
Income 
Contributed 
Participation 
Rates Risk Exposure 
lML - - - - - 
 - - - - - 
lM1L 1.338 -34 -0.469 -13.305 3.016 
 0.123 0.993 0.916 0.991 0.049 
lM2L 0.967 -837 0.312 -13.491 1.657 
 0.204 0.803 0.936 0.991 0.252 
lM2L – l M1L -0.371 -804 0.781 -0.185 -1.359 
 0.501 0.759 0.797 0.846 0.098 
lMM 1.848 -2,640 2.071 -12.482 2.448 
 0.014* 0.419 0.585 0.991 0.091 
lM1M 0.257 -96 -1.312 -0.108 -0.339 
 0.318 0.935 0.337 0.895 0.498 
lM2M 0.566 -88 -1.678 0.267 -0.412 
 0.020* 0.937 0.190 0.741 0.396 
lM2M – 
lM1M 0.308 8 -0.367 0.375 -0.073 
 0.050* 0.991 0.658 0.398 0.790 
lMU  - - - - - 
 - - - - - 
lM1U - - - - - 
 - - - - - 
lM2U - - - - - 
 - - - - - 
lM2U – lM1U - - - - - 
 - - - - - 
      
Cut 1     0.295 
Cut 2     3.543 
      
# of Obs. 4,929 4,458 4,475 4,959 4,470 
R2/Pseudo 
R2 
0.5011 
0.2458 
0.1245 
0.0321 0.0168 
      
*Significant at 5% , ** Significant at 1%. P-values are reported under estimated coefficients.  
 M – Millennials, G – Generation X, B - Baby Boomers (Generational Cohorts replaced Age Cohorts). 
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Table 6: Generation by Income Class Cohort Results: Panel B – Generation X 
 OLS OLS OLS Logit Ordered Logit 
 
Natural Log 
Pension 
Balances 
Amount of 
Income 
Contributed 
Percent of 
Income 
Contributed 
Participation 
Rates Risk Exposure 
lGL 1.590 -109 2.754 -12.501 2.487 
 0.033* 0.973 0.466 0.991 0.089 
lG1L -0.058 -227 -2.006 -0.656 -0.335 
 0.858 0.884 0.265 0.389 0.596 
lG2L  0.215 -115 -1.919 -0.152 -0.520 
 0.481 0.936 0.247 0.848 0.409 
lG2L – lG1L 0.273 112 0.088 0.505 -0.184 
 0.411 0.944 0.962 0.445 0.733 
lGM 2.811 -2,717 2.409 -12.366 2.152 
 0.000** 0.384 
 
0.505 0.991 0.119 
lG1M 0.125 -95 -0.583 0.000 0.092 
 0.081 0.767 0.120 0.999 0.495 
lG2M 0.228 168 -0.691 -0.142 -0.047 
 0.002** 0.607 0.068 0.520 0.734 
lG2M – lG1M 0.103 263 -0.109 -0.142 -0.138 
 0.175 0.444 0.785 0.493 0.282 
lGU 3.647 1,227 4.307 -11.655 2.628 
 0.000** 0.724 0.282 0.992 0.063 
lG1U 0.646 1,929 -4.597 0.843 -0.562 
 0.210 0.388 0.077 0.499 0.207 
lG2U 0.616 2,966 -0.824 -0.956 -0.112 
 0.171 0.134 0.720 0.243 0.783 
lG2U – lG1U -0.030 1,037 3.773 -1.798 0.450 
 0.951 0.628 0.130 0.096 0.266 
Cut 1     0.295 
Cut 2     3.543 
      
# of Obs. 4,929 4,458 4,475 4,959 4,470 
R2/Pseudo 
R2 
0.5011 
0.2458 
0.1245 
0.0321 0.0168 
      
*Significant at 5% , ** Significant at 1%. P-values are reported under estimated coefficients.  
 M – Millennials, G – Generation X, B - Baby Boomers (Generational Cohorts replaced Age Cohorts). 
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Table 6: Generation by Income Class Cohort Results: Panel C – Baby Boomers 
 OLS OLS OLS Logit Ordered Logit 
 
Natural Log 
Pension 
Balances 
Amount of 
Income 
Contributed 
Percent of 
Income 
Contributed 
Participation 
Rates Risk Exposure 
lBL 2.200 -255 1.534 -13.185 2.524 
 0.004** 0.940 0.693 0.991 0.088 
lB1L -0.013 345 -1.667 0.161 -0.304 
 0.973 0.850 0.415 0.820 0.633 
lB2L -0.131 -147 0.283 -0.097 -0.599 
 0.718 0.935 0.889 0.896 0.386 
lB2L – lB1L -0.118 -492 1.950 -0.258 -0.295 
 0.739 0.777 0.331 0.683 0.587 
lBM 3.016 -2,668 2.335 -12.390 2.183 
 0.000** 0.392 0.518 0.991 0.113 
lB1M -0.039 564 -0.444 -0.293 -0.293 
 0.551 0.057 0.195 0.115 0.012* 
lB2M -0.092 -213 -0.407 -0.463 -0.189 
 0.176 0.496 0.259 0.016* 0.131 
lB2M – lB1M -0.053 -777 0.037 -0.169 0.104 
 0.476 0.024 0.926 0.359 0.402 
lBU 3.620 5,290 0.532 -12.413 2.269 
 0.000** 0.104 0.887 0.991 0.101 
lB1U 0.404 1,631 -0.534 0.286 -0.339 
 0.101 0.135 0.675 0.369 0.065 
lB2U 0.291 -7 -1.086 0.165 -0.025 
 0.283 0.995 0.440 0.613 0.894 
lB2U – lB1U -0.113 -1,638 -0.551 -0.121 0.314 
 0.682 0.184 0.701 0.739 0.120 
      
Cut 1      0.295 
Cut 2     3.543 
      
# of Obs. 4,929 4,458 4,475 4,959 4,470 
R2/Pseudo R2 0.5011 0.2458 0.1245 0.0321 0.0168 
      
*Significant at 5% , ** Significant at 1%. P-values are reported under estimated coefficients.  
 M – Millennials, G – Generation X, B - Baby Boomers (Generational Cohorts replaced Age Cohorts). 
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Table 7: Generation by Home Equity Class Cohort Results: Panel A - Millennials 
 OLS OLS OLS Logit Ordered Logit 
 
Natural Log 
Pension 
Balances 
Amount of 
Income 
Contributed 
Percent of 
Income 
Contributed 
Participation 
Rates Risk Exposure 
lML - - - - - 
 - - - - - 
lM1L 10 0.340 -286 -1.313 -0.056 0.044 
 
0.189 0.813 0.334 0.946 0.932 
lM2L  0.584 -384 -1.614 -0.025 -0.201 
 
0.016* 0.737 0.207 0.975 0.686 
lM2L – lM1L 0.244 -98 -0.301 0.030 -0.245 
 
0.120 0.894 0.684 0.941 0.367 
lMM 0.122 -2,753 0.201 10.601 -0.895 
 
0.885 0.464 0.962 0.985 0.650 
lM1M 0.781 1,873 -1.395 -12.541 1.029 
 
0.414 0.679 0.783 0.982 0.625 
lM2M 0.482 1,770 -2.322 -10.404 1.216 
 
0.576 0.645 0.590 0.985 0.540 
lM2M – lM1M -0.299 -103 -0.927 2.137 0.187 
 
0.609 0.973 0.785 0.132 0.854 
lMU 0.826 -152 -5.778 - 13.474 
 
0.587 0.982 0.446 - 0.982 
lM1U 2.450 -2,423 -1.546 - -14.018 
 
0.642 0.918 0.953 - 0.982 
lM2U -1.346 3,045 8.799 - -12.437 
 
0.424 0.684 0.295 - 0.984 
lM2U – lM1U -3.796 5,468 10.345 - 1.582 
 0.457 0.810 0.714 - 0.502 
      
Cut 1     -1.941 
Cut 2     1.322 
      
# of Obs. 4,930 4,476 4,476 4,95515 4,471 
R2/Pseudo 
R2 
0.4974 0.1956 0.1332 0.0377 0.0206 
      
*Significant at 5% , ** Significant at 1%. P-values are reported under estimated coefficients.  
 M – Millennials, G – Generation X, B - Baby Boomers (Generational Cohorts replaced Age Cohorts). 
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Table 7: Generation by Home Equity Class Cohort Results: Panel B – Generation X 
 OLS OLS OLS Logit Ordered Logit 
 
Natural Log 
Pension 
Balances 
Amount of 
Income 
Contributed 
Percent of 
Income 
Contributed 
Participation 
Rates Risk Exposure 
lGL  0.859 28 0.221 0.062 -0.185 
 0.000** 0.979 0.857 0.937 0.704 
lG1L 0.184 -151 -1.002 -0.007 0.297 
 0.028* 0.698 0.022* 0.977 0.066 
lG2L   0.265 44 -0.944 -0.296 0.097 
 0.002** 0.912 0.036* 0.233 0.560 
lG2L – lG1L 0.081 196 0.057 -0.289 -0.201 
 0.348 0.629 0.900 0.188 0.173 
lGM 1.464 774 0.765 0.165 0.226 
 0.000** 0.492 0.545 0.838 0.651 
lG1M 0.299 266 0.974 -0.041 -0.197 
 0.029* 0.674 0.170 0.922 0.427 
lG2M 0.370 533 0.472 0.311 -0.154 
 0.005** 0.381 0.490 0.493 0.526 
lG2M – lG1M 0.071 267 -0.502 0.352 0.042 
 0.636 0.700 0.519 0.443 0.864 
lGU 1.932 2,316 2.507 0.519 0.805 
 0.000** 0.076 0.087 0.570 0.130 
lG1U 0.039 590 -2.868 0.126 -0.581 
 0.906 0.694 0.088 0.873 0.118 
lG2U 0.242 1,678 -1.711 -0.432 -0.276 
 0.377 0.176 0.219 0.508 0.419 
lG2U – lG1U 0.204 1,088 1.157 -0.558 0.305 
 0.567 0.502 0.525 0.436 0.404 
      
Cut 1      -1.941 
Cut 2     1.322 
      
# of Obs. 4,930 4,476 4,476 4,955 4,471 
R2/Pseudo 
R2 
0.4974 0.1956 0.1332 0.0377 0.0206 
      
*Significant at 5% , ** Significant at 1%. P-values are reported under estimated coefficients.  
 M – Millennials, G – Generation X, B - Baby Boomers (Generational Cohorts replaced Age Cohorts). 
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Table 7: Generation by Home Equity Class Cohort Results: Panel C – Baby Boomers 
 OLS OLS OLS Logit Ordered Logit 
 
Natural Log 
Pension 
Balances 
Amount of 
Income 
Contributed 
Percent of 
Income 
Contributed 
Participation 
Rates Risk Exposure 
lBL  1.142 108 -0.171 -0.066 -0.347 
 0.000** 0.922 0.890 0.932 0.477 
lB1L -0.034 -205 -1.109 -0.190 0.226 
 0.734 0.661 0.034* 0.469 0.209 
lB2L  -0.072 156 -0.822 -0.367 0.271 
 
0.472 0.743 0.123 0.167 0.152 
lB2L – lB1L -0.038 360 0.287 -0.177 0.046 
 
0.721 0.478 0.614 0.470 0.794 
lBM 1.468 591 0.717 0.608 0.200 
 0.000** 0.589 0.559 0.442 0.680 
lB1M 0.020 457 0.026 -0.920 -0.479 
 
0.828 0.297 0.958 0.003** 0.005** 
lB2M -0.046 -281 -0.139 -0.974 -0.429 
 0.639 0.540 0.788 0.002** 0.018 
lB2M – lB1M -0.067 -738 -0.164 -0.054 0.050 
 0.546 0.155 0.778 0.842 0.788 
lBU 2.003 4,503 1.321 -0.202 0.328 
 
0.000** 0.000** 0.305 0.794 0.498 
lB1U 0.107 3,040 -0.135 0.566 -0.512 
 0.476 0.000** 0.861 0.043* 0.001** 
lB2U 0.105 -1,256 0.630 0.306 -0.152 
 0.551 0.125 0.492 0.278 0.372 
lB2U – lB1U -0.001 -4,295 0.765 -0.260 0.360 
 0.995 0.000** 0.440 0.432 0.047* 
      
Cut 1      -1.941 
Cut 2     1.322 
      
# of Obs. 4,930 4,476 4,476 4,955 4,471 
R2/Pseudo 
R2 
0.4974 0.1956 0.1332 0.0377 0.0206 
      
*Significant at 5% , ** Significant at 1%. P-values are reported under estimated coefficients.  
 M – Millennials, G – Generation X, B - Baby Boomers (Generational Cohorts replaced Age Cohorts). 
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